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The International Standard, Business Aircraft Operations (IS-BAO), with a Safety
Management System (SMS) as its core element, has been widely accepted by both the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the business aviation industry as
the mechanism to create a healthy safety culture among the business aviation operators
who have implemented the standard. Scholarly literature, however, has presented
leadership as the most important factor in the creation and management of a healthy
safety culture in organizations in general and aviation organizations in particular. This
study examined and compared the effects of IS-BAO progression and leadership
performance on the perceptions of safety culture in IS-BAO-registered business aviation
organizations. Under the auspices of the International Business Aviation Council
(IBAC), the 566 IS-BAO registered operations in the United States were randomly
sampled, and 181 operators participated. For each selected operator, the IS-BAO
registration level and the number of years the operator was IS-BAO registered were
obtained through IBAC. Each of the 181 operators was provided a link to an electronic
survey. The survey measured respondent perceptions of safety culture and leadership
performance through the four leadership-organizational frames as theorized by Bolman
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and Deal (2013): structural, human resources, political, and symbolic. A total of 980
responses were received, of which 846 were usable and 771 actually used after
multivariate outliers were removed. Confirmatory factor analyses verified the safety
culture perceptions construct and factor loading on Bolman and Deal’s frames and
demonstrated convergent and discriminant validity. Structural equation model (SEM)
analysis determined the relationship between safety culture perceptions and IS-BAO
progression was not significant (R = -.026, p = .933). SEM analysis was also used to
examine the relationship between safety culture perceptions and leadership performance
in each of Bolman and Deal’s leadership frames and determined that the relationship
between safety culture perceptions and leadership performance in the structural frame
was positive and significant (R = .507, p = .013); the relationship between safety culture
perceptions and leadership performance in the human resources frame was positive and
significant (R = .505, p = .002), the relationship between safety culture perceptions and
leadership performance in the political frame was not significant (R = .268, p = .405), and
the relationship between safety culture perceptions and leadership performance in the
symbolic frame was not significant (R = -.483, p = .095). Results of this study indicated
that IS-BAO progression did not significantly affect safety culture perceptions, but
leadership performance, as manifested in the structural and human resources frames, did
affect safety culture perceptions. While the results were of limited generalizability due to
sample size limitations, they provided scientifically derived evidence to support the
importance of leadership in the creation and maintenance of positive safety culture in ISBAO-registered business aviation operations.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Safety culture in the aviation industry has been an area of significant interest since
the in-flight structural break-up of Continental Express Flight 2574 in 1991 and the
National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) decision to make safety culture the
exclusive topic at the U.S. National Summit on Transportation Safety in 1997
(Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma, & Mitchell, 2002). In the NTSB’s report on
the Continental Express accident, the Honorable Dr. John Lauber, an NTSB board
member at that time, focused on leadership’s impact on safety culture and suggested that
the probable cause of this accident included the “failure of Continental Express
management to establish a corporate culture which encouraged and enforced adherence to
approved maintenance and quality assurance procedures” (NTSB, 1992, p. 54).
Since the 1990s, there have been numerous studies and analyses performed on
aviation safety culture, but few have focused on business aviation and business aviation
organizations, and none has examined the impact of leadership performance on safety
culture in business aviation. The dearth of studies focused on business aviation would
seem to be a substantial oversight given that there are seven times the number of turbinepowered business jet aircraft than commercial passenger jet aircraft in the United States
and given that U.S. turbine-powered business aircraft operators have averaged over
8,500,000 flight hours annually since 2006, while maintaining an accident/incident rate
comparable with that of the major airlines (FAA, 2014; NBAA, 2014). It is the
industry’s focus on safety culture that has led to its safety record according to the
National Business Aviation Association (NBAA), which maintains that the “business
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aviation community is committed to the furtherance of a safety culture that is engrained
in the people and organizations that fly business aircraft” (2014, p. 30). If NBAA’s
contention is accurate, then it would be useful to understand the concept of safety culture
as it applies to business aviation and the effectiveness of the mechanism through which it
is implemented, especially with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimates that
the turbine-powered business aircraft fleet will grow by an additional 20,000 aircraft and
average 12,800,000 flight hours annually between now and 2034 (FAA, 2014).
In order to understand the impact of safety culture on aviation organizations in
general and business aviation organizations in particular, the concept must first be
defined. While definitions abound in modern scholarly and professional literature, for
purposes of this research, the following definition, developed in a study commissioned by
the FAA and derived from a review of the concept across several industries, is perhaps
the most comprehensive:
Safety culture is the enduring value and priority placed on worker and public
safety by everyone in every group at every level of an organization. It refers
to the extent to which individuals and groups will commit to personal
responsibility for safety, act to preserve, enhance and communicate safety
concerns, strive to actively learn, adapt and modify (both individual and
organizational) behavior based on lessons learned from mistakes, and be
rewarded in a manner consistent with these values. (Wiegmann et al., 2002, p. 8)
Prior to Weigmann et al.’s definition, Reason (1998) examined the cultural
composition of the organization when he summarized safety culture by using some of the
same elements, but Reason grouped those elements into two broad categories:
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“something an organization is (the beliefs, attitudes and values of its members regarding
the pursuit of safety), and as something that an organization has (the structures, practices,
controls and policies designed to enhance safety)” (p. 294).
Safety culture in business aviation organizations requires the appropriate
mechanism to establish and maintain it. According to the NBAA (2014), that mechanism
is the International Standard, Business Aircraft Operations or IS-BAO. IS-BAO has been
in existence for fifteen years, having been formally approved by the International
Business Aviation Council (IBAC) in late 2001 (IBAC, 2015b). The purpose of IS-BAO
is: “to promote global standardization and to assist operators in establishing quality flight
operations using best practices of business aircraft and of commercial and noncommercial helicopter operations worldwide” (IBAC, 2015b, p. i). As of early 2015,
there were over 700 IS-BAO registered business jet operators worldwide (IBAC, 2015a)
While standardized procedures and pseudo-regulatory limitations are part of the IS-BAO,
the standard centers on a safety management system (SMS) that is consistent with
standards prescribed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (IBAC,
2015b). ICAO (2013) defines an SMS as a “systematic approach to managing safety,
including the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and
procedures” (p. 10). IBAC (2015c) further describes an SMS as
A system that facilitates the attainment (of) organizational goals in an effective
and efficient manner through an integrated network of people and resources while
reducing the possibility of harm to persons or property through a continuing
process of hazard identification and risk management. (p. 3)
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IS-BAO-registered operators progress through three levels or stages of
registration as depicted in Table 1. Initial award of IS-BAO Stage 1 registration and
subsequent progression to Stages 2 and 3 are functions of the status and maturity of the
operator’s SMS as evaluated by IS-BAO-certified auditors.

Table 1
IS-BAO Registration Stages
Stage

Timing

Criteria

1

Initial registration

Confirms that the SMS infrastructure is established
and that safety management activities are
appropriately targeted. All supporting standards
have been established.

2

24 months after
initial registration

Ensures that safety management activities are
appropriately targeted and that safety risks are
being effectively managed.

Verifies that safety management activities are fully
integrated into the operator’s business and that a
positive safety culture is being sustained.
Note. Adapted from “IS-BAO: An International Standard for Business Aircraft
Operations,” 2015, p. 1-2. Copyright by IBAC.
3

24 months after
Stage 2 registration

Statement of the Problem
Since IS-BAO Stage 3 lists the sustainment of a positive safety culture as its
ultimate goal, it would seem to follow that if a business aviation organization has adopted
and implemented IS-BAO and has reached Stage 3, a safety culture congruent with that
defined by Wiegmann et al. should be extant. But ICAO (2013) described safety culture
as a subset of organizational culture. Similarly, the FAA (2010) maintained safety
culture is an aspect of an organization’s overall culture. Schein (2010) argued that
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organizational “culture creation and management are the essence of leadership
and…leadership and culture are two sides of the same coin” (p. 3). Kotter (1996) wrote
that cultural change starts with leadership. Further, the critical relationship between
leadership and healthy safety culture has not only been discussed in aviation safety
literature and scholarly publications, but also across a gamut of applications from energy
generation to health care (Exelon Corporation, 2012; Freiwald, 2013). There seems then
to be a possible contradiction as to whether leadership or IS-BAO has a greater effect on
business aviation safety culture.

Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study is to examine and compare the effects of IS-BAO
progression and leadership performance on the perceptions of safety culture in IS-BAOregistered business aviation organizations.

Hypotheses
Five hypotheses were necessary to examine and compare the effects of both ISBAO progression and leadership performance on safety culture perceptions in IS-BAOregistered aviation organizations. These hypotheses were tested using structural equation
modeling (SEM). Quantitative data was collected to measure safety culture perceptions,
IS-BAO progression, and leadership performance. Safety culture perceptions were
assessed through a survey instrument that measured the perceptions of those inside the
culture. IS-BAO progression was assessed as a function of an organization’s IS-BAO
stage and the years the organization had been IS-BAO registered. Leadership
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performance was assessed using a construct developed by Bolman and Deal (2013).
Bolman and Deal (2013) maintained that leaders interact with their organizations through
four distinct contexts or frames: the structural frame - how the leader attunes the
organization’s structure to its tasks; the human resources frame - how the leader aligns
the organization with human needs; the political frame - how the leader builds an agenda
and power base within the organization; and the symbolic frame - how the leader creates
meaning for the organization and those within it. The hypotheses that the SEM tested
were as follows:
H10 – There is no significant relationship between IS-BAO progression and safety
culture perceptions.
H1A – The relationship between IS-BAO progression and safety culture
perceptions is positive and significant.
H20 – There is no significant relationship between leadership performance in the
structural frame and safety culture perceptions.
H2A – The relationship between leadership performance in the structural frame
and safety culture perceptions is positive and significant.
H30 – There is no significant relationship between leadership performance in the
human resources frame and safety culture perceptions.
H3A – The relationship between leadership performance in the human resources
frame and safety culture perceptions is positive and significant.
H40 – There is no significant relationship between leadership performance in the
political frame and safety culture perceptions.
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H4A – The relationship between leadership performance in the political frame and
safety culture perceptions is positive and significant.
H50 – There is no significant relationship between leadership performance in the
symbolic frame and safety culture perceptions.
H5A – The relationship between leadership performance in the symbolic frame and
safety culture perceptions is positive and significant.

Significance of the Study
From a general perspective, scholarly research on any aspect of the business
aviation industry is somewhat rare, so the mere addition of this study to the body of
knowledge in the field can perhaps expand the foundation of scholarly research on the
industry for more investigation to build upon. But the specific significance of this study
lies in the research areas examined, three areas in the realm of business aviation that have
not been extensively studied: safety culture measurement, the evaluation of IS-BAO
progression on safety culture development, and the evaluation of leadership performance
on safety culture.

Safety Culture Measurement. This research utilized a survey instrument
specifically designed to measure safety culture in business aviation organizations. The
instrument provided measurements of safety culture constructs that parallel the safety
subcultures developed by Reason (1998). Preliminary research suggests that the survey
instrument used herein is one of very few in the industry that is targeted for business
aviation, has been scientifically tested, and is not subject to proprietary restrictions.

8
IS-BAO Progression. While IS-BAO registration is not mandatory in the
business aviation industry, IS-BAO registration meets the ICAO requirement for SMS
implementation (IBAC, 2015). This research described the impact of IS-BAO
progression on the perceptions of safety culture, and hence the effects of SMS
implementation on safety culture, in business aviation operations using quantitative data,
the first of its kind to do so.

Leadership Performance. The importance of leadership performance to
organizational culture in general and safety culture in particular has been discussed often
in scholarly, professional, and business aviation industry literature. But as yet no studies
have attempted to quantify this effect on business aviation organizations. This research
provided new information in this area as well.

Limitations
While random sampling was used to select operators for participation in the study,
operators had the option of participating in the study or refusing to participate based on
the decision of the aviation manager. After individual invitations were sent to each of the
566 U.S. IS-BAO-registered operators, only 181 operators elected to participate.
Additionally, individual members of each organization selected were encouraged but not
required to participate. Of 2,058 possible respondents, only 980 elected to participate,
and only 846 provided usable data. Once multivariate outliers were removed, only 771
responses were analyzed. Non-response bias tests were not feasible since benchmarking
data was not available for the population of IS-BAO-registered operators, and there was
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no mechanism to compare the respondent variable data with non-respondent variable
data. Demographic factors of pre-test and current study populations were compared and
were largely equivalent, hence it would seem that the population of respondents may not
have differed significantly from the population of non-respondents. Yet given the low
number of responses, non-response bias may have impacted the results. Further, while
the IS-BAO progression and leadership frame variables are discrete, it is possible that the
two variable areas were confounded in their effects on safety culture perceptions since
often it is those in leadership positions in business aviation organizations that are
responsible for their organization’s adoption of IS-BAO and subsequent progression
therein. The impact of both non-response bias and variable confounding could limit the
generalizability of the results of this study.

Delimitations
There are many factors that affect safety culture, but this study only focused on
the effects of IS-BAO progression and leadership performance. Further, this study
limited its discussion of leadership performance to that as measured through the four
leadership-organizational frames theorized by Bolman and Deal (2013). Finally, this
study only targeted IS-BAO-registered operators in the United States as its sampling
frame in order to avoid language or cultural interpretation issues in the wording of
questions on the survey instrument. While U.S.-registered operators comprise the
overwhelming majority of world-wide IS-BAO operators, they do not constitute the
entire population.
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List of Acronyms
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Adjusted Goodness-of-fit Index
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Analysis of Variance

AVE
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Structural Equation Modeling
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SPSS
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
The literature supporting this study comes from several topic areas, nearly all of
which pertain to the aviation industry. What follows is a review of the literature most
relevant to the study on the following topics:
1) Safety culture and organizational culture;
2) Leadership;
3) Organizational culture and leadership;
4) Leadership and safety culture;
5) Safety management systems and safety culture;
6) The measurement of safety culture in previous studies; and
7) The measurement of leadership perceptions in organizations.
In addition to providing background and context for this research, the literature
also revealed a gap in knowledge in the areas of business aviation safety culture
measurement as well as a gap in the knowledge of the effects of IS-BAO progression and
leadership performance on safety culture in business aviation organizations.
Before proceeding, a few words on the terms leadership and management are in
order. From a positional perspective, there are contexts where these terms are used
interchangeably and others where they are distinctly different. For the most part in the
literature to follow, the terms top management and senior leader were interchangeable
because the terms referred to positions within an organization and not the actions or
practices of those in the positions. In those cases, senior leader was used in the
discussion to avoid confusion. In some literature, however, the terms leadership and
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management connote different positions, with leadership defining those in senior
positions, and management defining those in middle management positions. In these
latter cases, both terms were retained in the discussion.
From a practices perspective, there have been numerous differences between
leadership and management that have been covered extensively in modern literature. For
the purpose of this research, the difference between the two is taken from Schein (2010)
where leaders are those who create and manage organizational culture while managers
are those who act and maintain the status quo within that culture.

Safety Culture and Organizational Culture
The search for a standard definition of safety culture can be somewhat
challenging in modern literature. In a 2004 study, Wiegmann et al. remarked that, “there
exists considerable disagreement among safety professionals, both within and across
industries, as to how safety culture should be defined” (p. 117). But later in the same
study, the authors gleaned several commonalities in the various definitions of safety
culture across several industries including aviation, nuclear and gas energy generation,
off-shore energy production, road transportation, and mineral production. Those
commonalities are (Wiegmann et al., 2004):
•

Safety culture is a concept defined at the group level or higher that refers to the
shared values among all the group or organization members;

•

Safety culture is concerned with formal safety issues in an organization and
closely related to, but not restricted to, the management and supervisory systems;
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•

Safety culture emphasizes the contribution from everyone at every level of an
organization;

•

The safety culture of an organization has an impact on its members’ behavior at
work;

•

Safety culture is usually reflected in the contingency between reward systems and
safety performance;

•

Safety culture is reflected in an organization’s willingness to develop and learn
from errors, incidents, and accidents; and

•

Safety culture is relatively enduring, stable, and resistant to change.
In one of the most commonly-referenced papers on the subject of safety culture,

Dr. James Reason (1998) presented the importance of shared values (what is important)
and beliefs (how things work) among employees that interact with an organization's
structures and control systems to produce behavioral norms where safety is concerned.
Reason also presented two treatments of safety culture: “as something an organization is
(the beliefs, attitudes, and values of its members regarding the pursuit of safety), and as
something that an organization has (the structures, practices, controls, and policies
designed to enhance safety)” (1998, p. 294).
Safety culture can also be defined simply as an organizational commitment to
safety at all levels of operation (McCune, Lewis, & Arendt, 2011) or as a fusion of
several safety subcultures (Table 2) per Reason (1998) and Stolzer, Halford and Goglia,
(2008): the informed culture, the flexible culture, the reporting culture, the learning
culture, and the just culture.
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Table 2
Safety Subcultures
Subcultures

Key attribute

Key behavior of members

The Informed Culture

Knowledge

Know what they need to know

The Flexible Culture

Adaptation

They can adapt when required

The Reporting Culture

Information

They tell what happened

The Learning Culture

Growth

They learn from the lessons

The Just Culture
Expectation
They know what to expect
Note. Adapted from “Safety Management Systems in Aviation” by A. J. Stolzer, C.
D. Halford, and J. J. Goglia, 2008. Copyright by A. J. Stolzer, C. D. Halford, and J.
J. Goglia.

ICAO (2013) has indicated that safety culture “encompasses the commonly-held
perceptions and beliefs of an organization’s members pertaining to the public’s safety and
can be a determinant of the members’ behaviour” (p. 21). ICAO also depicted the link
between safety culture and the culture of the organization which encompasses it, and
argued that the comprehension of organizational culture is crucial to understanding safety
culture (2013). The FAA (2010) made the same link, stating that the aspect of
organizational culture related to safety is, in fact, safety culture itself. IBAC (2015c)
maintained that in order to understand safety culture in an organization, one must first
understand the organization itself.
Guldenmund (2000) studied the relationship of safety culture to organizational
culture extensively and, using Schein’s work on organizational culture as a framework,
concluded that an understanding of an organization’s basic attitudes is essential to
comprehend the organization’s safety culture and climate. Yin (2012) examined the
relationship between safety culture and airline employees’ organizational identity to
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understand how airline employees implement SMS, and found that the loyalty factor of
organizational identity positively and significantly predicted the performance of SMS
through safety culture.
Schein (2010), one of the most cited writers on the subject of organizational
culture, defined organizational culture as:
A pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its problems
of external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well enough to
be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct
way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. (p. 18)
Schein (2010) also observed several, deep, complex, anthropological models that
refer to a range of observable events and underlying forces, which provide more insight
into the larger concept of organizational culture, such as:
•

Observed behavioral regularities when people interact: the language,
customs, and traditions that evolve;

•

Group norms: the implicit standards and values that evolve in working
groups;

•

Espoused values: the articulated publicly announced principles and values
that the group claims to be trying to achieve;

•

Formal philosophy: the broad policies and ideological principles that
guide a group’s actions;

•

Rules of the game: the implicit, unwritten rules for getting along in the
organization;
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•

Climate: the feeling conveyed in a group by the physical layout, and the
way in which members of the organization interact with each other, with
customers, or with other outsiders;

•

Embedded skills: special competencies displayed by group members in
accomplishing certain tasks;

•

Habits of thinking, mental models, and/or linguistic paradigms: shared
cognitive frames that guide the perceptions, thought, and language used by
the members of a group and are taught to new members in the early
socialization process;

•

Shared meanings: emergent understandings that are created by group
members as they interact with each other;

•

“Root metaphors” or integrating symbols: the ways that groups evolve to
characterize themselves, which may or may not be appreciated
consciously, but become embodied in material artifacts of the group; and

•

Formal rituals and celebrations: the ways in which a group celebrates key
events that reflect important values or important “passages” by members
such as promotion, completion of important projects, and milestones.

If one compares Schein’s list above with the list of safety culture definition
commonalities from Wiegmann et al. (2004) mentioned previously, there is substantial
correlation between the two that demonstrates the degree to which the elements of safety
culture must be embedded in the structure of organizational culture. Wiegmann et al.
(2002) presented the essence of safety culture as an organizational attribute when they
provided their formal, consolidated, definition of safety culture as:
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the enduring value and priority placed on worker and public safety by everyone in
every group at every level of an organization. It refers to the extent to which
individuals and groups will commit to personal responsibility for safety, act to
preserve, enhance and communicate safety concerns, strive to actively learn,
adapt and modify (both individual and organizational) behavior based on lessons
learned from mistakes, and be rewarded in a manner consistent with these values.
(Wiegmann et al., 2002, p. 8)

Leadership
A search for a definition of the term leadership presents the opposite dilemma
from that of a search for a definition of safety culture. Finding a definition of leadership
is relatively simple, but choosing one is difficult. A very small sample of the existing
literature illustrates the difficulty in narrowing one’s scope in the search for a single
definition but provides context for the direction of this study.
Helmrich (2015) provides thirty different definitions of leadership from business
owners, chief executive officers, and scholars but concludes that leadership is about
inspiring people to achieve goals. Economy (2015) defines leadership in terms of nine
traits to include awareness, decisiveness, empathy, accountability, confidence, optimism,
honesty, focus, and inspiration. Smith (1986), in his classic book on large organization
leadership, “Taking Charge,” defines leadership in terms of a philosophy based on 20
essential traits.
The emphasis on leadership traits has spawned entire leadership theories based on
those traits which are well summarized by Phillips (2012), but go beyond the scope of
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this study. Leadership has also been defined in terms of personality, the outcome of a
group process, influence, and as a pattern of activities and the focus of attention and
effort (Adamshick, 2007). Foisy (2008) detailed the differences in what are perhaps the
two most popular modern leadership theories, those of transactional and transformational
leadership, in his comparison of U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy flying squadron
commanders, and concluded there was no significant difference in the styles used by
those in the different services. Transactional leaders use a contingent reward system
wherein the leader solicits accomplishment of tasks by followers through promised
rewards, whereas transformational leaders motivate their followers using inspiration, a
sense of vision, and passion, and by exhibiting energy and enthusiasm (Foisy, 2008).
General and President Dwight David Eisenhower, the leader of what was arguably the
largest military force in history, summarized transformational leadership as “the art of
getting someone else to do something that you want done because he wants to do it, not
because your position of power can compel him to do it” (Eisenhower, 1960, p. 108).
Bolman and Deal (2013) reviewed much of the scholarly research on leadership in
preparation for their own work. They summarized the major theories on leadership as:
•

Leadership trait theory: how are leaders different?

•

Leadership style theory: how do leaders act?

•

Leadership contingency theory: how do circumstances affect leadership?

•

Leader-member exchange theory: what happens in the leader-follower
relationship?

•

Transformational leadership theory: how do leaders transform followers?
(Bolman & Deal, 2013, p. 340).
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Many leadership theories focus on the leader or on the manner in which the leader
interacts with subordinates, yet the theories do not directly address how the leader relates
with the culture of his organization and the effect the culture has on his followers, an
effect which goes well beyond those in the leader’s immediate circle. Lumpé (2006)
presented a comprehensive review of classical and modern leadership theories and
concluded that the real difference between those theories revolves around the theories’
relationship to organizational culture, specifically whether the leadership style is one
where the leader’s traits are independent of the organizational culture (the culture-free
thesis) or whether the leader’s style is bound to the organizational culture (the culturebound thesis). Lumpé (2006) concluded that the culture-bound thesis is more directly
related to how organizations work and is a more accurate reflection of how leaders lead
organizations. Pater (2012) agreed, using the term cultural changemaster to describe the
manner in which leaders are effective in organizations. Reitsema and Watkins (2012)
argued that the complexity of modern organizations is such that modern leadership is less
about the personnel in positions of authority and more about the organization as a system,
essentially making the argument that the leader’s effect on the organization’s culture is
vital for success.
It is the focus on leadership and organizational culture that forms the basis for
Schein’s theories. Schein (2010) wrote that leaders are defined through the
organizational culture they create and that after the culture is formed, it is the culture
itself that influences what kind of leadership is possible. He also explained that if
elements of the culture become dysfunctional, leaders are the only ones capable of
making the culture change (Schein, 2010).
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Table 3
Bolman and Deal’s Leadership Frames

Frame

Metaphor for
Organization

Central
Concepts

Image of
Leadership

Basic
Leadership
Challenge

Structural

Factory or
machine

Roles, goals,
policies,
technology,
environment

Social
architecture

Attune structure
to task,
technology,
environment

Family

Needs, skills,
relationships

Empowerment

Align
organization
and human
needs

Jungle

Power, conflict,
competition,
politics

Advocacy and
political savvy

Develop agenda
and power base

Human
Resources

Political

Culture,
Create faith,
meaning,
Carnival,
beauty,
Symbolic
metaphor, ritual, Inspiration
temple, theater
ceremony,
meaning
stories, heroes
Note. Adapted from “Reframing Organizations” by L. G. Bolman & T.E. Deal, 2013.
Copyright by L. G. Bolman & T.E. Deal.

Bolman and Deal (2013) held that leadership has evolved over the last 100 years
from a focus on the individual to a more complex view that focuses on the individual, the
relationship, and the context. They offer five propositions to capture that evolution:
•

Leadership is an activity, not a position;

•

Leadership is different from management;

•

Leadership is multilateral not unilateral;

•

Leadership is distributed evenly rather than concentrated at the top; and
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•

Leadership is contextual and situated not in the leader but in the exchange
between leader and constituents. (Bolman & Deal, 2013, pp. 344-346)

Bolman and Deal (2013) maintained that leaders interact with their personnel and their
organization via four leadership frames as detailed in Table 3.

Table 4
Bolman and Deal’s Reframed Leadership
Leadership is effective when:
Frame
Structural
Human
Resources

Political

Leadership is:

Leadership
process is:

Analyst,

Analysis,

Architect

Leadership is:

Leadership process
is:

Design

Petty bureaucrat or tyrant

Management by
detail or fiat

Catalyst,

Support,

Weakling,

Servant

Empowerment

pushover

Advocate,
Negotiator

Advocacy,
Coalitionbuilding
Inspiration,

Symbolic

Leadership is ineffective when:

Prophet, poet

Meaning-

Abdication

Con-artist,

Manipulation,

thug

fraud

Fanatic,

Mirage, smoke
and mirrors

charlatan
making
Note. Adapted from “Reframing Organizations” by L. G. Bolman & T.E. Deal, 2013.
Copyright by L. G. Bolman & T.E. Deal.

Bolman and Deal (2013) also argued that leaders are more effective when they
interact with their followers and organizations using all of the frames instead of a single
or few frames. In fact, they argue that a leader may have to manifest different attributes
and use different processes to be effective in the various frames, as presented in Table 4.
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Several scholarly articles have been written using Bolman and Deal’s frames
model as a mechanism to evaluate leadership across different businesses or activities.
Parry and Horton (1998) used Bolman and Deal’s approach in a case study on the
leadership of a Midwestern University and concluded the approach fit the historical data
they considered. Scott (1999) used Bolman and Deal’s construct and their instrument to
measure the effect of leadership and organizational climate on intercollegiate athletic
departments. He concluded the four frames were useful as descriptors of both leadership
and organizational climate among the departments studied (Scott, 1999). Sasnett and
Ross (2007) conducted a frame-based study of health science program directors and
concluded the directors were more confident of their human resource and structural skills
and less sure of the political and symbolic skills required of leaders. They further
concluded the directors’ mastery of the frame-based skills were correlated with their selfperceived effectiveness as managers and leaders (Sasnett & Ross, 2007). Sypawka
(2008) used Bolman and Deal’s frames to evaluate division deans within the North
Carolina Community college system, the third largest in the nation. He concluded the
deans interacted with their subordinates and organizations primarily through the human
resources and structural frames which placed much less emphasis on the political and
symbolic frames (Sypawka, 2008).
Phillips and Baron (2013), in a study of aviation program leaders, confirmed
Bolman and Deal’s conclusions in an aviation context. In their study, Phillips and Baron
(2013) used a survey instrument constructed by Bolman and Deal to measure a leader’s
performance in the four leadership frames as well as to measure leadership/management
effectiveness. Bolman and Deal’s instrument seems to be one of few surveys to measure
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leadership performance instead of leadership traits or transactions and has been widely
used in scholarly literature as summarized by Phillips (2012).
While this review has discussed many different aspects of leadership, for the
purposes of this study, the focus will be on the effect that leaders have on their
organizations, an effect that will be described as leadership performance. It is that
performance that seems to have the greatest impact on the next area to be reviewed.

Organizational Culture and Leadership
If safety culture is an element of organizational culture, as the ICAO (2013)
states, the factors with the greatest influence on organizational culture should have a
similar impact on safety culture. Among the factors influencing organizational culture,
leadership appears to be preeminent. Schein (2010) said that organizational “culture
creation and management are the essence of leadership and make you realize that
leadership and culture are two sides of the same coin” (p. 3). According to Kotter (1996),
culture, and the vision which accompanies it, are the responsibility of leadership. Kotter
also emphasized that leading change in an organizational culture is an activity that takes
considerable time and must be continually directed until the change is fully anchored in
the culture, arguing the importance of leadership in that process (1996). Bass and Avolio
(1993) believed that an organization's culture develops in large part from its leadership.
Schein (2010) argued that as an organization succeeds in accomplishing its primary task,
the leader’s assumptions become part of the culture of the organization, and new
members experience these cultural assumptions as a given, not as something to be
discussed, i.e.: “this is the way we do things around here” (p. 232). Figure 1 illustrates
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how a leader’s actions and attitudes cause culture to be embedded in an organization’s
personnel.

Figure 1. Leadership effect on organizational culture. Adapted from “Organizational
Culture and Leadership” by E. Schein, 2010, San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons.
Copyright by E. Schein.

In a study using Schein’s mechanisms as a template, Kelly and Earley (2009)
concluded the actions of the leaders of the Arthur Andersen accounting firm led to its
eventual demise. The leaders’ focus on profit maximization infected the entire culture of
the firm and essentially created the conditions for Andersen’s role in the Enron debacle
(Kelly & Earley, 2009). In a study of 32 CEOs, Giberson and his fellow researchers
concluded that the personality traits of CEOs directly affected the traits and values of the
organizations they led (Giberson et al., 2009). This study was the first to correlate what
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many had long suspected, that the cultures of organizations are reflections of those who
lead them (Giberson et al., 2009).

Leadership and Safety Culture
Thus far the literature has demonstrated that safety culture is an element of
organizational culture, and leadership has a major impact on organizational culture. Now
the relationship between leadership and safety culture may be examined, and there is an
abundance of literature that discusses the importance of that relationship in the aviation
industry.
The ICAO (2013) charged those in aviation leadership positions with the
development and promulgation of the organization’s safety policies, standard operating
procedures, and safety resource management. ICAO also required the appointment of an
accountable executive with direct responsibility for a safety program’s success where its
members and stockholders are concerned (2013). The FAA’s safety framework echoed
the ICAO requirements and specified that those in charge of aviation organizations are
primarily responsible for the organization’s safety management and safety culture (FAA,
2010). IBAC (2015c), in its publication “SMS Tools for Business Aircraft Operators,”
argues that organizational culture and leadership culture are primarily products of the
leaders that create them and insists that “without leadership, safety culture is a term, a
construct or a theory” (p. 8).
Flannery (2001), in a thesis describing the measurement of aviation safety culture,
compared the elements / major factors of safety culture as discussed by several experts in
the field. He concluded senior leadership commitment is a key element, component, or
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factor in every researcher’s description of safety culture and that without that
commitment, a healthy safety culture does not exist.
Wiegmann et al. (2004) maintained that an aviation organization’s commitment to
safety refers to the extent to which those in leadership positions identify safety as a core
value of the organization and guide the organization to demonstrate an enduring, positive
attitude toward safety, even in times of fiscal austerity. When senior leaders are
committed, they actively promote safety in a consistent manner across all levels within
the organization. Senior leadership also provides adequate resources and consistently
supports the development and implementation of safety activities as well as ensuring
every aspect of operations, such as equipment, procedures, selection, training, and work
schedules are routinely evaluated and, if necessary, modified to improve.
Stolzer et al. (2008) argued positive safety culture in aviation organizations is
generated from the top down and that those in senior leadership positions must set the
stage through their actions. Senior leaders must also demonstrate commitment to safety
in all decisions they make, including directing the resources of the organization to
address safety concerns. Further, senior leadership must establish safety as a core value
of the organization and acknowledge that the nature of the organization’s activities is
high-risk and high-consequence. Finally, trust must permeate the organization, and all
members of the organization must believe that they will be supported by the organization
when they make decisions in the interest of safety.
In an article encapsulating some 30 years of research on safety climate, a concept
that follows naturally from safety culture according to Guldenmund (2000), Zohar
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(2010), observed that the consensus of most writers on the subject has been that leaders
create climate and that leadership is a climate antecedent. Further he observed:
The relationship between leadership and safety climate has been largely explained
as an extension of the leader’s concern for group members’ welfare. Effective
leaders who have established high quality relationships with their unit members
care about their psychological welfare. Such caring extends to physical welfare in
situations involving heightened risk. (Zohar, 2010, p. 1519)
Torres (2011) said in “the Coast Guard, as in other military services, the term
command climate is often substituted for safety culture” (p. 111). To support his
statement, he provided a list of tasks that field commanders must be able to perform,
derived from a review of military literature:
•

Articulate a clear vision and establish attainable goals;

•

Allow subordinates freedom to exercise initiative;

•

Establish accountability at appropriate level;

•

Show confidence in subordinates;

•

Encourage and reward prudent risk-taking;

•

Achieve high performance through positive motivation and rewards;

•

Give clear missions within boundaries of autonomy;

•

Listen to subordinates and seek ideas;

•

Demonstrate concern about the welfare of subordinates; and

•

Establish and model high ethical standards. (Torres, 2011, pp. 111-112)

Torres (2011) also insisted that if safety culture and command climate are
interchangeable, then a major indicator of a positive command climate (or safety culture)
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is the credibility of the commander. When that credibility is high, there will be increased
reporting, trust, and confidence in the overall system and clear communications up and
down the chain of command in the organization.
McCune et al. (2011) wrote that in a healthy aviation safety culture, those in
leadership positions place strong emphasis on safety by manifesting the same behaviors
previously discussed. These behaviors include:
•

Understanding of hazards within the workplace,

•

Accepting criticism;

•

Remaining open to opposing views;

•

Fostering a climate that encourages feedback;

•

Emphasizing the importance of communicating relevant safety information;

•

Promoting realistic and workable safety rules; and

•

Ensuring staff are well educated and trained so that the consequences of unsafe
acts are understood. (McCune et al., 2011)
Wolf (2012), in a comprehensive review of the need for SMS implementation

throughout the aviation industry, argued that safety begins from the top in organizations,
and called for the executives of aerospace organizations to lead the way by developing a
safety culture that permeates each organization. He also discussed the importance of the
safety advisor in that process to ensure the executives have the latest information and data
to reinforce the safety culture.
Freiwald (2013) investigated the relationship among ethical leadership, an ethical
workplace climate, safety culture, safety behaviors, and measured safety outcomes of
workers in the high reliability organizations of aviation and healthcare. His research
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revealed that perceptions of an ethical workplace climate can yield significant impact
upon an organization’s safety culture, while workplace perceptions of ethical leadership
are directly related to safety outcomes.
Finally, Cooper (2015) wrote that a company’s safety culture is driven by an
executive leadership team that “creates, cultivates and sustains a company's journey to
excellence” (p. 49). Cooper believed it was the executives’ responsibility to set the
vision and strategic direction, provide resources, and constantly emphasize and reinforce
the importance of safety to people and the business.

Safety Management Systems and Safety Culture
Scholarly literature that discusses IS-BAO and safety culture is somewhat rare.
But since the SMS is the core element of IS-BAO, a review of the relevant literature that
discusses SMS and safety culture should provide a similar context to the possible impact
of IS-BAO on safety culture.
In one of the earliest articles written about SMS by a member of the FAA, Smith
(2005) wrote that to be successful, an SMS must be an integrated collection of policy,
architecture, assurance, and safety promotion. Smith argued that safety culture was part
of the safety promotion element of the SMS but also contended that the SMS had to be
implemented with a safety culture in place, or it would not be successful.
ICAO (2013) discussed the importance of safety culture and organizational
culture in the establishment and operation of an effective SMS but did not seem to
contend whether safety culture facilitates SMS implementation or is a product of that
implementation. In contrast, the FAA (2010), similar to Smith (2005), stated the
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structural elements to create a safety culture, including safety policies, are the items
which are most under management control and hence should be implemented first in
order to facilitate an effective SMS. IBAC (2015c) argued that safety culture provides
the environment or the atmosphere in which the SMS functions. Further, IBAC (2015c)
insisted that “safety culture is to SMS what air is to living creatures. If the atmosphere is
healthy, the SMS thrives. If the atmosphere is poisonous or non-existent, the SMS
becomes inanimate” (IBAC, 2015c, p. 7).
Grote (2012), in a review of safety management processes across several high-risk
activities, condensed the implementation of safety management into two separate
definitions. One definition focused on arrangements made by the organization for the
management of safety in order to promote a strong safety culture and achieve good safety
performance. Essentially, this definition focused on safety culture as the primary goal or
product of safety management with the aim of achieving good safety performance. The
other definition emphasized an organized approach to managing safety, including the
necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies, and procedures. In this
definition, safety culture isn’t mentioned specifically, and safety management is seen as
more process driven, similar to other management systems such as qualify management.
Grote (2012) does emphasize, however, that in most of the literature he reviewed, the
concept of safety culture is frequently evoked as both a prerequisite for and the effect of
good safety management.
Remawi, Bates, and Dix (2011) administered a safety culture survey to workers at
a large international airport to measure the change in worker safety attitudes a year after
an SMS had been introduced there. Using another large airport with an SMS in operation
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as a control group, the average score on the survey reported by survey respondents at the
airport with the new SMS increased significantly in the areas of safety communications,
safety rules, supportive safety environment, personal risk appreciation, work
environment, and involvement while the same scores from the airport that had an SMS in
place stayed constant. The authors concluded that the implementation of an SMS did
increase positive perceptions of safety culture.
Lin (2012) conducted a study of airline pilots in Taiwan to determine the
relationship of organizational identity, a function of organizational culture, to safety
culture and SMS implementation. He concluded that safety culture was strengthened as
the result of the implementation of an SMS and that the loyalty factor of organizational
identity positively and significantly predicted the performance of SMS through safety
culture. While his results indicated that SMS strengthened safety culture, Lin’s study
used SEM and path analysis to show that SMS performance was affected by the
employee’s loyalty to the organization and the employee’s identification with the
organization. According to Schein (2010), loyalty and identification are attributes of
organizational culture and are largely leadership driven. The impact on loyalty and
identity in Lin’s study begs the question of whether the improvement in those areas was
due to SMS implementation or the overall culture surrounding that implementation.
In the only study found that focused on business aviation, McNeely (2012)
researched the correlation between SMS implementation and organizational safety
culture with a survey of four 14 C.F.R. Part 135 on demand charter air carrier operators.
He concluded that the correlation between the level of SMS implementation and the level
of organizational safety culture was positive and significant. McNeely also concluded
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that the level of management involvement correlated positively and significantly with the
level of safety culture, but his study assumed that safety culture was a product of SMS
implementation and not a precursor for that implementation. Interestingly, while
McNeely addressed the theory that safety culture must exist for SMS implementation to
be effective, his study methodology did not seem to take that possibility into account.
Freiwald, Lenz-Anderson, and Baker (2013) studied the safety culture and
attitudes of a multi-campus, multi-national flight training organization that had
experienced multiple hull losses and had no formal safety management system in place.
Using a mixed methods approach incorporating survey research, they concluded that an
effective safety culture did not exist in the organization. They recommended the
implementation of a safety management system to create a better safety culture in the
organization.
Adjekum (2014) studied safety culture perceptions as a function of SMS
implementation in a four-year collegiate aviation program. Using a survey instrument
based on the Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS), he determined that
perceptions of safety culture improved the longer personnel remained with the program
and varied depending on the nationality of the respondent. While he discussed the
importance of safety culture to successful SMS implementation, he did not examine the
effect of SMS implementation on safety culture or vice-versa.
Woo (2015), in a case study of a small flight school organization, wrote that
developing and maintaining a strong safety culture is a critical prerequisite for
implementation of an SMS. He maintained that an SMS did not create a safety culture,
but that the safety culture provided the environment for the SMS to be effective.
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Overall, there is some disagreement as to whether safety culture is a precursor to
or a product of safety management system implementation in the literature reviewed. But
that same literature is consistent in depicting a positive relationship between safety
culture and SMS implementation, a relationship this study will further explore in the
context of IS-BAO implementation.

Measurement of Aviation Safety Culture in Previous Studies
Now that the literature involved with organizational culture, leadership, safety
culture, and safety management systems has been discussed, an examination of the
measurement of safety culture itself is in order. While this review is not exhaustive, it
provides an overview of the manner in which aviation safety culture has been measured
and reveals that business aviation safety culture measurement has largely been ignored.
Some of the studies reviewed in the preceding section are discussed again in this section;
however, the focus here is on the measurement and analysis mechanisms utilized by the
researchers rather than the conclusions presented.
Flannery (2001) discussed the measurement of safety culture in aviation, but only
spoke to the topic in theoretical terms. He derived definitions of safety and safety culture
and then presented possible measurement systems, finally concluding, at that time, an
adequate measurement tool for that measurement did not exist (Flannery, 2001).
Gibbons, von Thaden, and Wiegmann (2006) attempted to validate a safety
culture survey for aviation operations based on a five-factor model that included
organizational commitment, management involvement, pilot empowerment, reporting
systems, and accountability systems as they pertained to safety within an airline. The

34
survey, then designated as the Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS), was
designed around these five factors, and was distributed to pilots and managers of a large
U.S. airline for anonymous completion (Gibbons, von Thaden, & Wiegmann, 2006).
Results of the authors’ series of confirmatory factor analyses indicated that the original
five-factor model of safety culture did not fit as well as hypothesized (Gibbons et al.,
2006). The model was revised to focus on four main factors; organizational commitment,
operations interactions, formal safety system, and informal safety system.
Díaz-Cabrera, Hernández-Fernaud, and Isla- Díaz (2007) evaluated a safety
culture measurement instrument that centered on the organizational values and practices
related to the safety management system. They explored seven dimensions that reflected
underlying safety meanings and the four cultural orientations in the field of safety arising
from the competing values framework (Díaz-Cabrera et al., 2007). The authors then
surveyed 299 participants from five companies in different industrial sectors, only of one
which was aviation-related. While they admitted that their results were inconclusive,
they noted that organizations in different industrial sectors seemed to emphasize different
safety-related organizational values and hence, the safety cultures in each sector varied
from its counterparts in other sectors.
Guldenmund (2007) said that questionnaires were not particularly successful in
measuring organizational safety culture. He believed they focused too much on
evaluations of those in charge and not on the basic cultural assumptions at different levels
of the organization (Guldenmund, 2007). Guldenmund seemed to disregard the impact of
leadership on that culture in his 2007 study, a curious outcome given that his earlier
research involved multiple references to Schein’s work (Guldenmund, 2000).
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Von Thaden, Kessell, and Ruengvisesh (2008) built upon von Thaden’s earlier
work by administering the revised four-factor CASS to the flight operations department
of a large, major European airline. Their analysis confirmed the existence of a positive,
effective safety culture within the organization (von Thaden, Kessel, & Ruengvisesh,
2008).
Later in 2008, von Thaden and Gibbons released an FAA-funded report
describing the measurement construct of their revised instrument, now named the Safety
Culture Scale Measurement System (SCISMS) (von Thaden & Gibbons, 2008). The
authors said their instrument fused techniques to measure both organizational safety
culture and professional safety climate in aviation organizations and provided a tool to
measure the evolution of organizational safety culture in large commercial airlines.
In 2010, Kelly, Meyer, and Patankar used SEM to verify a pyramid construct of
safety culture first proposed by Patankar and Sabin in 2008. The pyramid consisted of
four distinct yet interdependent layers, to wit:
The base of the pyramid included safety values and unquestioned assumptions
that serve as the foundation of the model. The second layer is described as safety
strategies and consists of leadership strategies, policies, procedures,
organizational norms, history, legends and heroes. The third level of the pyramid
represented the safety climate of the organization and consists of the short and
near-term set of attitudes and opinions surrounding safety. The apex of the
Pyramid represented safety behaviors and consists of individual and group safetyrelated behaviors within the organization. (Kelly, Meyer, & Patankar. M., 2012, p.
4)
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Using data from an existing dataset from a major international carrier and
questions selected from four different survey instruments, Kelly et al. demonstrated that a
four-factor model based on the pyramid construct fit the data somewhat better than a
single-factor model through confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) (2012). They then
analyzed different groups of respondents to determine if the factor loadings on the CFA
were higher for some groups of respondents than others, such as managers, production
supervisors and engineers (Kelly et al., 2012). Although the model fit all three groups
well, it seemed to fit the managers and production supervisors better than the engineers.
Apparently, no pilots were surveyed.
To assess safety culture in their study of workers at two international airports,
Remawi, Bates, and Dix (2011) used a survey instrument constructed by the authors’
research supervisors, largely based on the U.K. Workplace Health and Safety Culture
Survey. The survey used a 5-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5
(strongly disagree). Demographic questions were included to identify participant
characteristics. The survey was presented twice to personnel at the airports with a year’s
time between each presentation. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on
the data generated by the instrument to determine if the mean scores of the safety culture
variables were significantly different for personnel at each airport after a year had passed.
At the airport where the SMS had been in place all along, the control airport, the mean
scores of the safety culture survey variables were not significantly different between the
two survey presentations. At the airport where the SMS had been newly implemented,
the mean scores of the safety culture survey variables were significantly different
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between the two presentations and indicated personnel felt the safety culture had
improved.
Lin (2012) built a unique survey instrument for his study of airline pilots in
Taiwan that focused on the relationship of organizational identity (essentially
organizational culture) to safety culture and SMS implementation. Based on interviews
with safety managers and content analyses of the airlines safety manuals and safety audit
reports, he constructed a 37-question survey using a 5-point Likert scale to assess the
respondent’s attitude toward the airline’s safety culture and safety management system.
Lin analyzed the data generated by his survey with SEM and path analysis and concluded
that organizational identity positively impacted safety culture and SMS implementation.
In his research on the correlation between SMS implementation and safety
culture, McNeely (2012) adapted a survey from Gibbons, von Thaden, and Wiegmann’s
CASS. His instrument was developed via field tests using the input of subject matter
experts and featured a 5-point Likert scale for respondents to rate their perceptions of
safety culture and safety management system effectiveness. He concluded that the
correlation between the level of SMS implementation and the level of organizational
safety culture was positive and significant. Further, he noted that the relationship
between management commitment (leadership) and safety culture was positive and
significant as was the relationship between safety promotion (a function of leadershipdirected safety policy) and safety culture. While McNeely’s research provides context
for the present study, it focused on a small number of air carrier operators and did not
include private corporate operators. The small number of operators surveyed, four,
correspondingly limited the number of organizational cultures examined and hence did
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not determine the effect of SMS implementation across a wide cross section of
operations.
Freiwald, Lenz-Anderson, and Baker (2013) used Gibbons, von Thaden, and
Wiegmann’s CASS, with a 5-point Likert scale, to collect quantitative data in their
assessment of the safety culture of a multi-national, multi-campus flight training
organization. They used factor analysis to validate the constructs of the 83-item
instrument, organizational commitment, management involvement, pilot empowerment,
reporting systems, and accountability systems, but this portion of their analysis of the
factor loading was somewhat inconclusive because they only received 63 responses with
which to analyze the 83 variables. However, their multivariate analysis of variance
produced useable results that showed positive and significant relationships between
attitudes toward the various safety culture elements in the CASS and respondent
characteristics such as respondent location, gender, and position within the company.
Adjekum (2014) studied safety culture perceptions as a function of SMS
implantation at a four-year collegiate aviation program. Like previous researchers,
Adjekum used a modified and re-validated version of the CASS that he called the
Collegiate Aviation Program Safety Culture Assessment Survey (CAPSCAS). The
CAPSCAS featured 62 items, each with a 5-point Likert scale and assessed respondent
attitudes on the areas of their organization’s formal safety program, informal safety
program, operations interaction, and organizational commitment. Interestingly, while
Adjekum discussed the safety subcultures developed by Reason (1998), he did not
attempt to modify the CASS in a manner to assess those subcultures, but instead used the
original subareas developed by von Thaden, Wiegmann, and Gibbons. Adjekum received
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142 usable responses from the 944-member sampling frame he developed, and conducted
an ANOVA to determine if there were significant differences in respondent attitudes
toward safety culture as a function of the respondent’s time in the program and whether
the respondent was a U.S. or international student. He concluded the longer a respondent
spent in the program, the better the respondent’s perceptions of the safety culture, and
U.S. students had more favorable perceptions of the safety culture than did international
students.
The USAF also uses survey tools to assess safety culture. The service’s
Combined Mishap Reduction System (CMRS) features ten safety culture surveys for
elements of operational units such as operations and maintenance (USAF, 2012). The
surveys provide quantitative data using a 5-point Likert scale and also solicit
demographic information on the respondent (USAF, 2012).
In summary, modified versions of von Thaden, Wiegmann, and Gibbons’ CASS,
a tool developed to assess safety culture in large commercial operations, seems to be
common when assessing aviation safety culture in aviation organizations that are not
commercial in nature, including the one study of a business aviation organization
reviewed here. A modified version of the CASS is used to assess safety culture in this
study and will be discussed in depth in the next chapter.

Measurement of Leadership Performance in Aviation Organizations
There have been many studies that have measured the effect of leadership and
styles of leadership on organizations, yet surprisingly few have dealt with aviation
organizations.
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Lumpe (2006), in his study of leadership and organization in the aviation industry,
used an instrument he adapted from the organizational culture assessment tool developed
by Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness Research Program. His
instrument was designed to measure respondents’ opinions of overall organizational
culture from within 12 different professional cultures or clusters he identified within the
aviation industry from line technicians to flight crew to information technology
professionals to middle and strategic management. While Lumpe’s focus was applicable
to the present study, the tool he used focused more on the culture itself and not
leadership’s impact or performance on that culture.
Foisy (2008) measured differing levels of transactional, transformational, and
passive-avoidant leadership behaviors between USAF and U.S. Navy flying squadron
commanders and determined there were not significant differences between the two
groups. The instrument he used, the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ), uses
45 questions to assess the leadership behaviors using a 5-point rating scale. While the
MLQ is widely recognized as a validated instrument to measure leadership behaviors, the
behaviors it measures, transactional and transformational leadership, focus more on the
leader’s behavior in relationship to the subordinate and less on the leader’s behavior as it
relates to the culture of the organization. In his research, Foisy (2008) focused on
leadership behaviors themselves and not leadership performance for the organization.
Krear-Klostermeier (2012) also used the MLQ to measure the leadership styles of
FAA air traffic control managers. She found that the transformational style of leadership
prevailed in her research, but she, like Foisy (2008), focused on leadership style not
necessarily leadership performance (Krear-Klostermeier, 2012).
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Freiwald (2013) studied the effect of ethical leadership on safety outcomes in
high-reliability organizations in both the aviation and health care fields. The data
collection device he used featured 31 questions that measured leadership integrity but did
not assess leadership performance.
Using Bolman and Deal’s Leadership Frame Questionnaire, Phillips and Baron
(2013) measured the effectiveness of the leaders of collegiate aviation programs as a
function of the organizational frame in which the leader operated. The authors chose
Bolman and Deal’s instrument because they believed Bolman and Deal’s leadership
construct, along with its associated instrument, was the most appropriate tool to
accurately measure the impact of collegiate aviation program leaders on their associated
organizations.
Even with the few studies on aviation leadership performance located and
discussed, a reasonable cross-section of measurement instruments have been utilized.
Instruments have focused on various elements such as organizational culture, leadership
traits, the ethics of leadership, and the impact of leaders on their organizations. Hence it
would seem that the choice of the applicable instrument is a function of the goal of the
research or researcher.

Summary
The literature presented has manifested a few items of consensus that seem clear:
1) Safety culture is an element of organizational culture and can be, to a degree,
defined;
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2) Rather than traits or actions, leadership performance, a measure of a leader’s
effect on his or her organization, is the most applicable construct to assess for the
purpose of this study;
3) Leadership performance can be defined in the context of organizational culture
and, correspondingly, organizational culture is largely a function of leadership
performance;
4) Safety culture, as an element of organizational culture, is also largely a function
of leadership performance;
5) SMS has had a favorable impact on safety culture in aviation;
6) Most of the safety culture measurement that has taken place in the aviation
industry has focused on commercial aviation. Yet even the studies that have not
concentrated on commercial aviation have used adaptations of the CASS for
safety culture measurement. It would seem then, that adaptions of the CASS for
safety culture measurement outside of commercial aviation have been accepted as
valid by scholarly writers;
7) Most leadership measurement instruments for studies involving aviation
organizations have not focused on leadership performance. Bolman and Deal’s
Leadership Frames Questionnaire is a notable exception and will be discussed in
the next chapter;
8) Apart from McNeely (2012), there have been no other studies found that have
addressed safety culture or safety culture measurement in business aviation; and
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9) There have been no scholarly studies of the effects of IS-BAO implementation or
leadership performance on safety culture in business aviation organizations. This
gap in knowledge will be addressed by this study.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
In order to examine and compare the effects of IS-BAO progression and
leadership performance on business aviation safety culture, this study focused on U.S. ISBAO-registered operators and used a data collection instrument that measured both the
safety culture perceptions and leadership performance as assessed by the members of
those operations. Data generated by the instrument was evaluated using descriptive
statistics, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and structured equation modeling (SEM).
This research was conducted with the approval and cooperation of IBAC (Appendix H)
as well as the approval of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University (Appendix G).

Research Approach
The variable constructs referenced in this research appear in Table 5.
Quantitative data was collected via survey instrument and analyzed. Analysis was
comprised of a first order CFA on the safety culture constructs, a first order CFA on the
leadership performance constructs, a second order CFA to test discriminant validity
between the two constructs, and a SEM to test the hypotheses. Standardized regression
weights generated by the SEM were examined to determine if the hypothesized
relationships were positive and significant. Regression weights were also compared to
determine which relationships might be stronger than others. A simplified version of the
SEM appears in Figure 2. The full SEM appears in Appendix F.
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Table 5
Variable Constructs
Construct Name

Construct Label

Construct Inputs

Safety Culture
Perceptions

SCP

Survey Variables SCP_1 - SCP_23

IS-BAO Progression

IP

IS_Stage & IS_Years

Leadership Performance
in the Structural Frame

LP_SF

Survey Variables SF_1 - SF_8

Leadership Performance
in the Human Resources
Frame

LP_HRF

Survey Variables HRF_1 - HRF_8

Leadership Performance
in the Political Frame

LP_PF

Survey Variables PF_1 - PF_8

Leadership Performance
in the Symbolic Frame

LP_SYF

Survey Variables SYF_1 - SYF_8

Population/Sample
To adequately target the population of U.S. IS-BAO-registered operators, random
cluster sampling with replacement was the initial sampling methodology envisioned.
Vogt, Gardner, and Haeffele (2012) recommended the use of cluster sampling when a
frame of individual respondents is not readily available. In order to limit language and
national cultural interpretation issues, the sampling frame was confined to the population
of 566 IS-BAO registered operators (the clusters) based in the United States at the time of
the study, as supplied by IBAC’s Director of IS-BAO, Sonnie Bates (personal
communication, June 22, 2015). Krejcie and Morgan (1970) indicated that given a
population of 566 members to study or survey, a sample size of 229 is sufficient; hence
229 operators were to be selected from the population for this study. The roster of U.S.based IS-BAO registered operators was numbered sequentially and then randomly
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ordered. Initially, the process was to involve email invitations to the aviation managers
of each of the first randomly-selected 229 operations to ask the manager if his or her
organization would participate. For each aviation manager that declined, another would
be selected further down the roster. In actuality, due to the lack of response, individual
invitations with embedded survey links were sent to each of the 566 aviation managers on
the roster, with the goal of only using the first 229 organizations on the randomly-ordered
list that chose to participate. This methodology may have affected the randomness of the
sampling method and, in fact, generated a sample of convenience. Only 181 operators
elected to participate and of those, 69 operators had only one survey respondent. Of the
2,058 possible participants among the 181 operators, 980 chose to participate for a
response rate of 47.62%.
Westland (2010) analyzed studies and approaches for the determination of the
minimum sample size necessary to adequately evaluate a SEM and derived a formula for
minimum sample size. Soper (2015) implemented that formula in an online calculator to
ascertain that minimum sample size. Using a desired effect size of .1, the smallest effect
/ correlation level discussed by Westland (2010), a statistical power level specified by
convention of .8 (Soper, 2015), and the 57 observed and 10 latent variables in the SEM
(Figure 2), the calculator generated a minimum sample size of 703 cases to detect effect,
a minimum sample size of 160 cases to validate the model’s structure, and a
recommended sample size of 703 cases. This criteria was achieved by the data collected
and analyzed.
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Data Collection Device
The data collection instrument used in this research (Appendix A) is composed of
two surveys, one that measures safety culture perceptions and another which measures
leadership performance. The instrument was administered through the Survey Monkey
website at www.surveymonkey.com.

Safety culture instrument description. In order to develop a tool to assess
safety culture in business aviation operations, an instrument was devised that features
questions adapted from a published version of the CASS (Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006),
a question derived from Dr. James Reason’s safety culture survey (Transport Canada,
2008), and questions derived from Stolzer et al. (2008). An annotated version of the first
pre-test instrument with question-by-question citations appears in Appendix B. The
instrument included several features that were used to optimize it for business aviation
operators:
•

It contained questions designed to measure the five safety subcultures listed by
Reason (1998) and Stolzer et al. (2008): the informed culture, the flexible culture,
the reporting culture, the learning culture, and the just culture;

•

Questions were included to assess leadership performance in the context of safety
culture;

•

Question phraseology was modified to use terms familiar to business aviation
personnel; and

•

Survey length was limited to allow for swift completion since participation would
be voluntary.
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The instrument was pre-tested twice using IBM’s Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) AMOS software to assess its content and construct validity as
well as its reliability (Broyhill, 2014). The first pre-test used data collected from 13 ISBAO registered operators with 101 respondents. An exploratory factor analysis revealed
eight factor areas instead of six, although some of the factor areas generated could not be
assessed adequately due to sample size limitations. The exploratory factor analysis also
showed that the variables that assessed leadership performance did not factor into one
discrete area but were spread across several other measurement areas. The instrument
demonstrated content validity as assessed by the respondents and also demonstrated scale
reliability in all but one measurement area, the flexible culture (Broyhill, 2014).
The second pre-test collected data from 18 IS-BAO registered operators with 232
respondents (Broyhill, 2014). A revised instrument was used (Appendix C), featuring the
five areas specified by Reason (1998) and Stolzer et al. (2008) and a leadership area. A
seventh area, the empowered culture, which reflects employees’ ability to change the
organization and is closely aligned with the concept of empowered accountability as
described by Cortés and Rogers (2013), was added as a result of the findings of the first
pre-test. Sample size in the second study was adequate, and after a confirmatory factor
analysis and accompanying post hoc analyses were conducted, the revised instrument
revealed high content validity and construct validity. The instrument also demonstrated
adequate scale reliability overall in all but one subarea, the flexible culture (Broyhill,
2014).
For the instrument used in the current study (Appendix A), survey questions 6-9
on the second pre-test instrument (Appendix C), which measured “The Flexible Culture”
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per Reason (1998) and Stolzer et al. (2008) were removed due to low scale reliability.
Survey questions 28-30 on the second pre-test instrument (Appendix C), which measured
“The Leadership Culture” were removed to prevent cross-loading on the leadership
performance constructs. The rating scale for respondents was changed from a 7-point
Likert scale in the original instrument to a 5-point Likert scale to match the rating scale
on the leadership performance measurement instrument.

Safety culture instrument reliability. The scale reliability statistics for the pretest of the applicable measurement areas of the safety culture assessment instrument
appear in Table 6. The standardized Cronbach’s alpha values show adequate scale
reliability in all areas. Scale reliability was assessed again in the current study using the
same criteria.

Table 6
Pre-Test Safety Culture Measurement Instrument Reliability
Measurement Area

Questions

α − unstandardized

α − standardized

The Informed Culture

5

.714

.730

The Empowered Culture

4

.716

.718

The Reporting Culture

5

.758

.763

The Learning Culture

4

.680

.704

The Just Culture
5
.811
.822
Note. These reliability statistics were not published in the cited AeroSafety World article
(Broyhill, 2014) but were produced in the research that generated the article

Safety culture instrument validity. While construct and content validity for the
instrument were confirmed in the pre-tests, since a revised instrument was used in the
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current study, additional tests for validity were required. A first order confirmatory
factor analysis was conducted in the current study to confirm the construct validity of the
instrument. Model fit, convergent, and discriminant validity were assessed as part of the
analysis, the methodology and criteria of which is discussed later in the study.

Leadership instrument description. The decision process for a leadership
performance measurement instrument considered two criteria. First, the instrument had
to actually measure leadership performance, not leadership traits. Second, the instrument
had to be relatively brief in order to ensure maximum voluntary participation by
respondents.
Denison (2015) offered the use of the Denison Survey, an instrument that
measures organizational culture as affected by leadership performance. Conversations
with Mr. Ken Uehara at Denison revealed that respondents would not only have to
complete the organizational culture survey but also complete a 360-degree survey on
those in leadership positions, and the results from the two surveys would have to be
correlated to measure leadership performance (personal communication, April 21, 2015).
Although the Denison instrument has been validated through scholarly study (Denison,
Nieminen, & Kotrba, 2014), the required survey process seemed too lengthy to ensure
maximum participation by respondents.
The Leadership Circle also offered the use of the Leadership Culture Survey
which measures leadership performance across two domains, creative competencies and
reactive tendencies (TLC, 2015). The instrument featured 62 questions / variables and
required the respondent to answer each item twice, once in the context of the way the

51
respondent feels the organizational leaders currently act and once in the way the
respondent feels organizational leaders would act in the respondent’s conception of an
ideal organization (TLC, 2015). Further discussion with Mr. Michael O’Connor of The
Leadership Circle revealed that the comparison between the scores generated by
respondents’ ideas of the present organization versus those of the respondents’ ideas of
the ideal organization provided the measure of leadership performance (personal
communication, April 22, 2015). While this survey offered scientifically valid and
reliable data, the length of the questionnaire, some 124 items, seemed excessive for
potential respondents in business aviation organizations. Also, the alignment of the
survey constructs did not parallel Schein’s conception of leadership performance in the
context of organizational culture.
Bolman and Deal’s Leadership Frames Questionnaire was the instrument that
seemed most suitable both to the measurement of leadership performance (included in
Instrument at Appendix A and in original form in Appendix D). Also, since the
instrument contained only 32 total questions, it seemed to be brief enough to ensure
maximum participation. Bolman and Deal’s survey is designed to specifically measure
leadership performance across the four leadership frames theorized by the designers.
Interestingly, while Bolman and Deal (2013) and Phillips (2012) maintain that symbolic
frame is where the classic elements of organizational culture are found, the behavior that
leaders use to embed culture in their subordinates and organizations per Schein (2010),
seen in Figure 1, align well with the structural, human resources, and symbolic frames, as
depicted in Table 7. Bolman’s permission to use the instrument for this study appears in
Appendix E.
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Table 7
Comparison of Leadership Culture Behaviors and Leadership Frames
Leadership Culture Embedding Behavior
Schein (2010)

Corresponding Leadership Frame
Bolman & Deal (2013)

What gets paid attention to, measured,
and controlled on regular basis

Structural

Reactions to critical incidents and
organizational crises

Structural

How resources are allocated

Political

Deliberate role modeling, teaching and
coaching

Human Resources

How rewards and status are allocated

Political

Who gets recruited, promoted, retired, or
Human Resources
excommunicated
Note. Adapted from “Organizational Culture and Leadership,” by E. Schein, 2010.
Copyright by E. Schein. Also adapted from “Reframing Organizations,” by L. G.
Bolman & T.E. Deal, 2013. Copyright by L. G. Bolman & T.E. Deal.

Leadership instrument reliability. Spearman Brown coefficients and
Cronbach’s alpha values for each of the leadership frame areas appear in Table 8 along
with the number of cases analyzed for each value. Cronbach’s alpha values were
recalculated for these four frame measurement areas in the current study.

Leadership instrument validity. In addition to Phillips (2012) and Phillips and
Baron (2013), Bolman and Deal’s instrument has been used by the authors themselves in
six published studies, by other authors in two books and in forty published studies, and
by doctoral candidates in over 50 dissertations, nearly all of which deal with the
leadership frame construct (Bolman, 2010). These studies took place over a 20-year time
period from 1990 to 2010 (Bolman, 2010). In order to ensure thoroughness for this
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study, a first order CFA was performed to assess the construct validity of Bolman and
Deal’s instrument. Model fit as well as convergent and discriminant validity were
assessed.

Table 8
Leadership Frame Instrument Reliability Statistics
Measurement Areas

Questions

Cases

Spearman-Brown

Cronbach α

Structural Frame

8

1309

933

.920

Human Resources Frame

8

1331

929

.931

Political Frame

8

1268

911

.913

Symbolic Frame

8

1315

937

.931

Note. Adapted from “Research Using Leadership Orientations Survey Instrument,” by
L.G. Bolman, 2010. Copyright by L. G. Bolman.

Treatment of the Data
The aviation manager for each organization that participated was provided a
survey link at www.surveymonkey.com unique to his or her organization. The aviation
manager was then asked to forward the link to all of the personnel in the organization.
Sixty-nine aviation managers did not forward the link, 112 did. Each of the 980
respondents participated anonymously through the assigned link. While the Survey
Monkey website does collect internet protocol address data, that information was
discarded. One question on the instrument collected demographic data on the
respondent’s level in the organization, but no other individual information was solicited.
While data was grouped by operator due to the issuance of separate links for each

54
organization participating, no internal matching or correlation took place once the data
was entered into the SPSS software.

Descriptive statistics. The 57 quantitative variables generated by the instrument
were analyzed for univariate mean, standard deviation, mode, skew, and kurtosis.
Frequency histograms were generated to provide a visual depiction of the distribution of
the data. Multivariate kurtosis was also calculated.

Missing Data. The design of the instrument was such that it should have forced
completion of all required questions once attempted by the respondent. The design did
not, however, prevent survey participants from exiting the survey once underway. Of the
980 responses received, 134 were discarded due to respondents either not agreeing with
the informed consent statement at the beginning of the survey or partially completing the
survey and then exiting the survey once underway. The remaining number of usable
responses was 846.

Non-response Bias. Non-response bias occurs when the non-response rate for a
survey is substantial enough that those who do respond may not constitute a
representative sample of the targeted sampling frame (Vogt, Gardner, & Haeffele, 2012).
Typically, there are three reasons for non-response in survey research: 1) potential
respondents never receive the survey, 2) respondents cannot complete the survey because
they don’t have the required data, or 3) respondents refuse to complete the survey
(Groves et al., 2009). Of these three reasons, the last one is the most difficult for
researchers to deal with because of the potential effect on the variables of interest
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(Groves et al., 2009). Unfortunately, there appears to be no consolidated agreement
among research experts as to the level of response in which non-response bias can be
ignored, with some experts arguing that 50% response is sufficient while other maintain
that 85% is minimally adequate (Groves et al., 2009).
The most effective method to deal with non-response bias is for the researcher to
do everything he or she can to maximize response and minimize non-response in the first
place (Vogt, Gardner, & Haeffele, 2012). Mechanisms to minimize nonresponse can
include thorough pre-test of survey instruments, avoiding rushed or short data-collection
periods, sending reminders to potential respondents, ensuring confidentiality of
respondents, or offering incentives to respondents (Penwarden, 2013). For this study,
nearly all of these mechanisms were incorporated. The safety culture perceptions
instrument was pre-tested twice and the leadership performance instrument was used in
multiple scholarly studies. The data collection period was extended from one to two
months to ensure adequate time for response. Multiple general reminders were sent to all
aviation mangers from IBAC and multiple individual reminders were sent to aviation
managers by the researcher. Individual and organization confidentiality was emphasized
in all communications as was the assurance that no group data for participating
organizations would be presented. The only incentive offered was possibility of
contributing to the safety of the business aviation industry and to the improvement of the
IS-BAO, both of which were emphasized by IBAC in its communication.
Once the data was collected, nonresponse bias needed to be addressed at both the
operator and respondent level. Both of these tasks were challenging. At the operator
level, while IBAC’s sponsorship of the study made the request for operator participation

56
more official, the choice as to whether or not to participate was made by the applicable
aviation manager. Of the 566 U.S. IS-BAO-registered operators listed in IBAC’s roster,
four operators’ registrations had lapsed, making them ineligible to participate. An
additional 13 operators were not contacted because they had either ceased operations or
their contact information in IBAC’s database was not current. Of the remaining 549
operators, 181 chose to participate, and one refused to participate based on the current
workload of the organization’s personnel. The remaining 367 operators not only did not
participate, but also did not respond to communications from either IBAC or the
researcher in spite of multiple attempts at communication.
At the individual respondent level, lack of response was assumed to be generated
by respondent refusal to participate since the survey was distributed to respondents
electronically via email and since nearly all members of business aviation organizations
are required to possess and be knowledgeable in the use of computer technology. Most
business aviation professionals maintain dynamic schedules and travel extensively, so
refusal to participate may have been as much a function of task prioritization as it was the
manifestation of a particular attitude or opinion. The phenomenon of survey burnout may
have also contributed to respondent refusal to participate.
Imputation of survey values for non-respondents was difficult to perform with a
consistent methodology. Values for non-respondents in organizations that did not
participate could not be estimated because there is no database where the type of
information collected by this instrument had been previously sampled. Values for nonrespondents inside participating organizations could have been estimated, but for 69
operators there was only one respondent for the entire organization, and the number of
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respondents for the other 112 operators varied considerably. Hence, the calculation of
organizational averages as values for imputation would not have been consistent and
could have resulted in skewed data.
Sampling bias appears to have been limited, if present at all. While the pre-tests
were conducted with small, all volunteer populations of IS-BAO-registered operators
with the encouragement of the applicable aviation manager, this study targeted the entire
population of U.S. IS-BAO-registered operators. There was some limited overlap
between the two populations. Chi-squared tests for independence were conducted on
three demographic characteristics for the pre-test and current study populations. The chisquared tests showed that the two populations were homogenous in the areas of IS-BAO
stage (Χ2 = 3.51, p = .173) and employee levels (Χ2 = 3.35, p = .187) but were
heterogeneous in the area of number of years IS-BAO (Χ2 = 102.68, p = .000). This
would seem to indicate that respondents and non-respondents, both at the organizational
and individual levels, were not markedly different.

Assumptions. The most critical assumption for the application of multivariate
statistical analysis techniques is that of univariate and multivariate normality and
associated limited values of skewness and kurtosis (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson,
2010). However, where survey instruments are concerned, particularly those using Likert
scales, both skewness and kurtosis are somewhat common (Byrne, 2010) and were
assessed as part of the analysis. Fortunately, the effects of non-normal distributions can
be negligible as sample size becomes larger (Hair et al., 2010).
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While outliers would not seem to be an issue given the expected kurtosis for
survey instruments using Likert scales, especially the five-item Likert scale on the survey
instrument used for this study, a standard test for multivariate outliers, the squared
Mahalanobis distance (D2), was computed for each variable case. Typically, an outlying
case will have a D2 value that is distinctly different from other D2 values (Byrne, 2010).
Using the conservative thresholds discussed by Hair et al. (2010) and Kline (2011), 75
cases in the current study that demonstrated D2 values that were distinctly different (4 or
greater) and with associated p values less than .001 were excluded from analysis. This
left 771 cases for analysis in the current study.

Construct Validity Assessment. The CFA models for the safety culture and
leadership performance constructs as well as the SEM itself were analyzed for goodnessof-fit (GOF) before the hypotheses tests were conducted. All data was analyzed using
IBM’s SPSS AMOS software, version 23. The 771 cases analyzed satisfied the
minimum sample size to validate the model structure as specified by Westland (2010).
Model GOF was assessed using the GOF statistics and criteria in Table 9. Although there
is some divergence in SEM literature where the appropriateness of fit statistics and
associated criteria are concerned, there was general agreement in Byrne (2010), Kline
(2011), and Garson (2015) about the criteria used in Table 9 and throughout this study.
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Table 9
CFA and SEM GOF Statistics and Criteria
GOF Statistic

Abbreviation

Fit Criteria

Χ2 to degrees-of-freedom ratio

CMIN/df

< 3 = good fit

Goodness-of-fit index

GFI

> .9 = adequate fit
> .95 = good fit

Adjusted goodness-of-fit index

AGFI

> .9 = adequate fit
> .95 = good fit

Root mean square error of
approximation statistic

RMSEA

< .05 = good fit

Comparative fit index

CFI

> .9 = adequate fit
> .95 = good fit

Normed fit index

NFI

> .9 = adequate fit
> .95 = good fit

Post hoc analyses using modification indices calculated by the AMOS software
were required to adapt the CFA models and the SEM to better fit the data. Byrne (2010)
discussed the use of modification indices associated with covariances to re-specify the
model when the addition of covariances make sense within the context of the model.
Garson (2015) recommended limiting the addition of covariances to intra-factor
variables. In the post hoc analyzes conducted on the CFAs and the SEM, modification
indices selected to re-specify the models were limited to those associated with intra-factor
covariances only.
Convergent validity and discriminant validity were assessed for the CFAs.
Convergent validity was assessed using the factor loadings on construct elements and the
average variance extracted (AVE) per Hair et al. (2010) and through scale reliability per
Garson (2010) and Hair et al. (2010). Discriminant validity was assessed through change
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in model fit per Byrne (2010) and comparison of AVE versus average squared correlation
values per Hair et al. (2010).

Hypothesis Testing. Once model fit, convergent validity, and divergent validity
were assessed, the hypotheses were tested using the SEM and evaluating the regression
weights for the applicable paths. If the standardized regression weight was positive and
significant at p = .05 or less, the null hypothesis was rejected. The hypotheses are listed
below, and their applicability to the SEM is illustrated in Figure 2.
H10 – There is no significant relationship between IS-BAO progression and safety
culture perceptions.
H1A – The relationship between IS-BAO progression and safety culture
perceptions is positive and significant.
H20 – There is no significant relationship between leadership performance in the
structural frame and safety culture perceptions.
H2A – The relationship between leadership performance in the structural frame
and safety culture perceptions is positive and significant.
H30 – There is no significant relationship between leadership performance in the
human resources frame and safety culture perceptions.
H3A – The relationship between leadership performance in the human resources
frame and safety culture perceptions is positive and significant.
H40 – There is no significant relationship between leadership performance in the
political frame and safety culture perceptions.
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H4A – The relationship between leadership performance in the political frame and
safety culture perceptions is positive and significant.
H50 – There is no significant relationship between leadership performance in the
symbolic frame and safety culture perceptions.
H5A – The relationship between leadership performance in the symbolic frame and
safety culture perceptions is positive and significant.

Figure 2. Simplified SEM with Hypotheses Annotated. Notation has been adapted to
reflect variable flow. The notation is not consistent with that used in AMOS SEM
modeling diagrams. The full SEM appears in Appendix F.

Ethics and IRB Considerations. An IRB application for human subjects testing
was submitted and approval received prior to data collection for this study (See Appendix
E). The electronic submission and collection mechanism (www.surveymonkey.com) did
provide some identifying data for respondents, but that data was discarded. The
researcher did agree to provide the aviation managers of the organizations that
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participated summary data of their organization’s average scores versus the overall
averages. Respondents were advised that organizational averages and overall averages
would be provided to their aviation manager.

Summary
While the technical description of methodology used in the current study is
important, the purpose and intentions behind the methodology should not be overlooked
as part of that discussion. The quantity of data received, the quality of data generated,
and the thoroughness of the analysis performed all contributed to the overall objective of
the study: the examination and comparison of the effects of IS-BAO progression and
leadership performance on safety culture perceptions.
While the sampling mechanism did not operate as envisioned or provide as large a
representation of the U.S. IS-BAO-registered operator population as expected, the results
received probably reflected the population sufficiently and were definitely adequate to
validate the structures of the CFAs and SEM. Hence, the quantity of data generated was
likely sufficient to measure the effects of IS-BAO progression and leadership
performance on safety culture perceptions.
The safety culture and leadership performance assessment instruments used to
generate the data received were pretested and validated in previous studies before their
use in the current study. The methodology described was built, in part, to test and
validate the safety culture and leadership performance constructs again in the current
study. The previous and current tests ensure the quality of data generated was sufficient
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to measure the effects of IS-BAO progression and leadership performance on safety
culture perceptions.
With sufficient quantity and quality of data, the methodology discussed allows for
tests of the hypotheses that actually measure the effects of IS-BAO progression and
leadership performance on safety culture perceptions. The results of that methodology
are presented in the next section.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Data Preparation
As previously discussed, of the 980 responses or cases received, 134 were deleted
because the respondent did not consent and opted out of the survey, or the respondent
completed only the safety culture perceptions portion of the survey and did not complete
the leadership performance portion. The remaining 846 cases were analyzed for
multivariate outliers and 75 cases with D2 values 4 or greater with associated p values
less than .001 were discarded for analysis in the final SEM model, leaving a total of 771
respondent cases for examination.

Participants
The 771 respondents that generated the cases for examination were employees of
156 U.S. IS-BAO-registered operators. Of these 156 operators, 51 had only one
respondent, the person who received the survey link, and 105 had multiple respondents
because the link was forwarded throughout the department. The majority of the
responding operators, 127 of 156 or 81.4%, were corporate flight departments operating
under 14 C.F.R. Part 91. The remaining 29 operators (18.6%) operated under 14 C.F.R.
parts 135, 141, and 125. The proportion of the IS-BAO Stages of the respondent
organizations appears at Figure 3. The years that the operators were IS-BAO-registered
ranged from a low of less than one year to a maximum of 14 years, and the distribution
appears at Figure 4. The distribution of employee levels among the individual
respondents appears at Figure 5.
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Figure 3. Operator proportion vs IS-BAO registration stage
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Figure 5. Individual respondent employee level. Line employees were defined as flight
crew members, technicians, or schedulers; middle managers were defined as standards
captains or lead technicians; and senior management was defined as chief pilots, directors
of maintenance, and directors of aviation.

Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the IS-BAO and safety culture perceptions variables
appear in Table 11. Descriptive statistics for the leadership performance variables appear
in Table 12. IS-BAO Stage was limited to the values of 1, 2, or 3. Years IS-BAOregistered could assume any integer value of 1 or above. The remaining values were
derived from a Likert Scale that generated a score value from 1 to 5. Questions that were
negatively phrased were reverse-coded so greater positive values were generated for
more negative responses. The mean values of the SC and LP variables represent the
average participant response to the questions presented in Appendix A.
One of the most important criteria for both CFA and SEM using the maximum
likelihood method of estimation is for the data to be multivariate normal, particularly
where the multivariate kurtosis of the sample is concerned (Byrne, 2010).
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The univariate kurtosis for each variable in Tables 11 and 12 is less than 7, the
maximum recommended value (Byrne, 2010). Multivariate kurtosis was a bit more
complicated to assess because it had to be measured in three different constructs. While
Byrne (2010) stated that a critical ratio of multivariate kurtosis greater than 5 means that
there is multivariate non-normality present in the data, Hair et al. (2010) argued that the
effects of multivariate non-normality can by mitigated by larger sample sizes. The
generally accepted ratio to minimize those effects is 15 respondents for each variable
tested (Hair et al., 2010). The critical ratios of multivariate kurtosis for the first order
CFAs for SCP and LP as well as for the SEM are presented in Table 10. While all the
ratios are above 5, the maximum value recommended by Byrne (2010), the number of
cases/respondents analyzed, 771, is greater than the minimum ratio required to mitigate
the effects of multivariate non-normality for both the SCP and LP CFAs, but not greater
than that required for the SEM. Hence, some multivariate non-normality may exist in the
data and may generate some bias in the results.

Table 10
Multivariate Kurtosis Summary for Study Constructs

Construct

Critical Ratio of
Multivariate Kurtosis

Number of
Variables

Minimum Cases to Overcome
Multivariate Non-Normality

SCP CFA

68.95

23

345

LP CFA

75.05

32

480

SEM

74.26

57

855

Note. 771 cases analyzed. Minimum cases computed per Hair et al. (2010), 15 cases or
respondents for each variable analyzed.
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Table 11
Descriptive Statistics for IS-BAO and Safety Culture Perceptions Variables
Variable

Mean Std.
Mode Skewness Skewness Kurtosis Kurtosis
Deviation
Critical
Critical
Ratio
Ratio

IS_Stage
IS_Years

2.423
6.497

0.719
3.252

3
6

-0.829
0.33

-9.403
3.741

-0.638
-0.479

-3.616
-2.714

SCP_1
SCP_2
SCP_3
SCP_4
SCP_5
SCP_6
SCP_7
SCP_8
SCP_9
SCP_10
SCP_11
SCP_12
SCP_13
SCP_14
SCP_15
SCP_16
SCP_17
SCP_18
SCP_19
SCP_20
SCP_21
SCP_22
SCP_23

4.23
4.45
4.13
4.20
3.73
3.86
4.15
4.17
4.29
4.15
4.34
3.68
4.09
4.01
4.23
4.30
4.00
4.20
3.76
3.99
4.08
4.15
3.85

.716
.727
.941
.745
.971
1.005
.801
.851
.875
.755
.826
.931
.866
.819
.829
.743
.762
.887
1.115
.968
.862
.854
.813

4
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
4
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

-.922
-1.645
-1.271
-.944
-.818
-.817
-.967
-1.095
-1.360
-.800
-1.456
-.525
-.974
-.825
-1.207
-1.273
-.813
-1.423
-.734
-1.097
-1.035
-.946
-.671

-10.447
-18.644
-14.407
-10.698
-9.275
-9.258
-10.960
-12.410
-15.418
-9.068
-16.509
-5.950
-11.041
-9.348
-13.678
-14.435
-9.217
-16.126
-8.316
-12.438
-11.730
-10.729
-7.606

1.734
3.873
1.447
1.436
.207
.209
1.237
1.276
1.809
.765
2.350
-.241
.815
.784
1.525
2.632
1.138
2.375
-.319
.977
1.132
.721
.784

9.826
21.949
8.201
8.141
1.173
1.186
7.009
7.234
10.254
4.338
13.318
-1.368
4.617
4.446
8.644
14.919
6.451
13.459
-1.81
5.535
6.417
4.085
4.443

Note. N=771 for all variables.
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Table 12
Descriptive Statistics for Leadership Performance Variables
Variable Mean Std.
Mode Skewness Skewness
Deviation
Critical
Ratio
SF_1
4.06 .895
4
-.931
-10.554
SF_2
4.03 .888
4
-.979
-11.098
SF_3
4.13 .915
4
-1.071
-12.141
SF_4
3.98 .903
4
-.933
-10.579
SF_5
4.16 .889
4
-1.101
-12.476
SF_6
3.95 .952
4
-.800
-9.069
SF_7
4.06 .965
5
-.893
-10.124
SF_8
4.12 .915
4
-1.115
-12.634
HRF_1 4.10 .969
5
-.970
-10.995
HRF_2 3.93 1.059
4
-.970
-10.996
HRF_3 3.93 1.022
4
-.783
-8.872
HRF_4 3.88 1.029
4
-.818
-9.278
HRF_5 4.07 .914
4
-.967
-10.967
HRF_6 3.91 1.030
4
-.825
-9.355
HRF_7 4.03 .974
4
-.878
-9.958
HRF_8 4.05 1.001
5
-.970
-10.991
PF_1
4.01 .922
4
-.867
-9.832
PF_2
3.66 1.007
4
-.526
-5.965
PF_3
3.53 1.047
4
-.458
-5.193
PF_4
3.70 .960
4
-.643
-7.285
PF_5
3.85 .958
4
-.752
-8.522
PF_6
3.80 .985
4
-.791
-8.966
PF_7
3.86 1.011
4
-.807
-9.154
PF_8
3.88 .873
4
-.868
-9.838
SYF_1
4.00 1.036
5
-.989
-11.206
SYF_2
3.55 1.080
4
-.463
-5.253
SYF_3
3.66 1.061
4
-.646
-7.325
SYF_4
3.69 1.010
4
-.556
-6.299
SYF_5
3.99 .968
4
-.902
-10.223
SYF_6
3.71 1.026
4
-.634
-7.185
SYF_7
3.85 1.050
4
-.855
-9.692
SYF_8
3.95 1.030
4
-.957
-10.848
Note. N=771 for all variables.

Kurtosis Kurtosis
Critical
Ratio
.641
3.634
1.022
5.795
.888
5.03
.815
4.618
1.025
5.808
.233
1.32
.176
0.997
1.102
6.244
.325
1.842
.282
1.599
-.070
-0.399
.083
0.473
.686
3.89
.012
0.071
.154
0.871
.264
1.497
.403
2.283
-.259
-1.467
-.324
-1.834
.214
1.211
.221
1.253
.318
1.8
.252
1.428
.865
4.904
.382
2.166
-.455
-2.578
-.195
-1.108
-.195
-1.104
.362
2.054
-.038
-0.215
.057
0.322
.437
2.475
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Reliability Testing
Table 13 presents the scale reliability for all of the constructs and scales used in
the study. While unstandardized and standardized values of Cronbach’s α were
calculated for all scales, the standardized values are most applicable for the two data
items used to calculate IS-BAO progression since the data items have different
measurement scales. The standardized values for all scales are well above the accepted
minimum of .7 (Field, 2013), hence the scale reliability for all constructs used in the
study may be considered adequate.

Table 13
Study Construct Scale Reliability
Measurement Area

Variables α − unstandardized α − standardized

IS-BAO Progression

2

.477

.852

The Informed Culture

5

.775

.789

The Empowered Culture

4

.758

.760

The Reporting Culture

5

.813

.813

The Learning Culture

4

.805

.809

The Just Culture Scale

5

.864

.868

Safety Culture Perceptions

23

.948

.949

The Structural Frame

8

.939

.940

The Human Resources Frame

8

.956

.956

The Political Frame

8

.920

.921

The Symbolic Frame

8

.955

.955

Leadership Performance

32

.982

.983

All Assessed Variables

55

.982

.982
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Validity Testing
Construct validity was evaluated by assessing convergent and discriminant
validity for the first order CFA on the leadership performance construct and the first
order CFA on the safety culture perceptions construct. A second order CFA linking the
leadership performance and safety culture perceptions constructs was necessary to further
test for discriminant validity. GOF statistics were evaluated for all models.

Leadership Performance Construct CFA. To demonstrate the construct
validity of Bolman and Deal’s Leadership Frames assessment instrument and its
associated measurement of leadership performance, a first order CFA was performed on
the construct. One post hoc analysis was performed using modification indices
associated with intra-factor error terms.
The final GOF values generated by the AMOS software confirmed acceptable to
good model fit in all but one indicator, adjusted goodness-of-fit (AGFI). Table 14 shows
the pre and post hoc GOF statistics for the Leadership Performance CFA. The final CFA
model appears at Appendix I.
The leadership performance construct validity assessment statistics appear in
Table 15. The construct displayed strong convergent validity. Scale reliability for all
constructs was greater than .7 (Hair et al., 2010). All standardized factor loadings and all
AVE values were greater than .5 (Hair et al., 2010). Discriminant validity was more
difficult to assess. The model fit improved with the post hoc analysis and demonstrated
positive changes in GOF criteria (Byrne, 2010) (Table 14), demonstrating some evidence
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of discriminant validity. But the squared correlation values for factor loadings were
greater than the AVE values, not less (Hair et al., 2010), demonstrating evidence of a lack
of discriminant validity. Given these conflicting results, the model did not seem to
provide enough evidence to evaluate discriminant validity.

Table 14
Leadership Performance Construct CFA GOF Statistics
GOF Statistic

Criteria

CMIN/df

< 3

First Run Value

Final Run Value

3.532

2.669

GFI

>/= .9 - .95

.867

.908

AGFI

>/= .9 - .95

.846

.888

.057

.047

RMSEA

< .05

CFI

>/= .9 - .95

.954

.971

NFI

>/= .9 - .95

.937

.955

Table 15
Leadership Performance Construct CFA Validity Statistics

Subconstruct

Scale
Reliability
AVE
α

Subconstruct
Correlation

Squared
Correlation
Value

LP_SF

.940

.644

LP_SF vs LP_SYF

.893

LP_HRF

.956

.722

LP_PF vs LP_SYF

.943

LP_PF

.921

.567

LP_HRF vs LP_SYF

.974

LP_SYF

.955

.725

LP_HRF vs LP_PF

.876

LP_SF vs LP_PF

.929

LP_SF vs LP_HRF

.887

Note. Subconstruct descriptions appear in Table 5.
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Safety Culture Perceptions Construct CFA. To demonstrate the construct
validity of the safety culture perceptions assessment instrument, a first order CFA was
performed on the construct. Two post hoc analyses were performed using modification
indices associated with intra-factor error terms.
The final GOF values generated by the AMOS software for the safety culture
perceptions construct confirmed acceptable to good model fit. Table 16 shows the pre
and post hoc GOF statistics for the safety culture perceptions CFA. The final CFA model
appears at Appendix J.

Table 16
Safety Culture Perceptions Construct CFA GOF Statistics
GOF Statistic
CMIN/df

Criteria
< 3

First Run Value

Final Run Value

3.786

2.853

GFI

>/= .9

.908

.933

AGFI

>/= .9

.884

.912

.06

.049

RMSEA

< .05

CFI

>/= .95

.935

.959

NFI

>/= .9

.914

.938

Safety culture perceptions construct validity statistics appear in Table 17. The
construct displayed adequate convergent validity. Scale reliability for all constructs was
greater than .7 (Hair et al., 2010). Nearly all standardized factor loadings were greater
than .5, but only two of five AVE values were greater than .5 (Hair et al., 2010). Similar
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to the leadership performance construct, discriminant validity was challenging to assess
for the safety culture perceptions construct. The model fit improved with the post hoc
analysis and demonstrated a positive change in GOF criteria (Table 15), demonstrating
some evidence of discriminant validity (Byrne, 2010) but the squared correlation values
for factor loadings were greater than the AVE values, not less, demonstrating evidence of
a lack of discriminant validity. Thus the safety perceptions construct did not provide
sufficient evidence to evaluate discriminant validity.

Table 17
Safety Culture Perceptions Construct CFA Validity Statistics

Subconstruct

Scale
Reliability
AVE
α

Subconstruct
Correlation

Squared
Correlation
Value

IC

.789

.416

IC vs JC

.778

EC

.760

.384

IC vs LC

.916

RC

.813

.441

IC vs RC

.863

LC

.809

.521

IC vs EC

.922

JC

.868

.558

EC vs JC

1.01

EC vs LC

1.01

EC vs RC

1.04

RC vs JC

.947

RC vs LC

1.03

LC vs JC
.815
Note. Subconstruct names abbreviated for space. IC = Informed Culture, EC =
Empowered Culture, RC = Reporting Culture, LC = Learning Culture, JC = Just Culture
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Second Order Leadership Performance and Safety Culture Perceptions
CFA. Due to the lack of evidence to evaluate discriminant validity in the leadership
performance and safety culture perceptions constructs and because the design of the SEM
has the safety culture perceptions factors loading onto a second order construct, a second
order CFA, combining the leadership performance and safety culture perceptions
constructs, was devised in order to determine if the two second order constructs were
truly discrete. The second order model linked the final versions of the leadership
performance CFA and the safety culture perceptions CFA, and no post hoc analyses were
performed.
In this model, the AVE values for the standardized factor loadings onto the
second order constructs were .966 and .956 for the safety culture perceptions and
leadership performance constructs, respectively. The squared correlation between the
two was .600, which is less than both AVE values. The second order construct
demonstrates both convergent and discriminant validity.
The model appears at appendix K and the GOF statistics appear at Table 18. The
combined model demonstrated adequate to good fit in all statistics except goodness-of-fit
index (GFI) and AGFI, which demonstrated mediocre but acceptable fit.
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Table 18
Second Order Leadership Performance and Safety Culture Perceptions CFA GOF
Statistics
GOF Statistic
CMIN/df

Criteria

Value

< 3

2.137

GFI

>/= .9 - .95

.863

AGFI

>/= .9 - .95

.848

RMSEA

< .05

.038

CFI

>/= .9 - .95

.956

NFI

>/= .9 - .95

.92

Hypothesized SEM. With construct validity demonstrated for the leadership
performance and safety culture perceptions constructs, the next step in the analysis was to
assess the GOF for the hypothesized SEM which combined the two constructs (Appendix
F). The initial analysis in the AMOS software showed adequate to good fit in all but two
GOF indices, GFI and AGFI. Post hoc analyses were performed which used
modification indices associated with intra-factor covariances only. The final version
appears at Appendix L. With all intra-factor modification indices applied, GOF values
improved, but GFI and AGFI remained below the conventionally-accepted thresholds
(Table 19).
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Table 19
Hypothesized SEM GOF Statistics
GOF Statistic
CMIN/df

Criteria
< 3

First Run Value

Final Run Value

2.450

1.901

GFI

>/= .9 - .95

.834

.878

AGFI

>/= .9 - .95

.819

.862

.043

.034

RMSEA

< .05

CFI

>/= .9 - .95

.939

.964

NFI

>/= .9 - .95

.902

.927

Byrne (2010) argues that GFI and AGFI are very sensitive to sample size. Kline
(2011) states that mean values of GFI can actually increase as sample size increases and
GFI values can fall outside of the 0 - 1.0 range, making them meaningless. Sharma et al.
(2005) conducted an extensive study of model fit indices and concluded GFI was an
unreliable index and should not be used. Garson (2015) argues that GFI and AGFI are
biased downward when degrees of freedom are large relative to sample size. Table 18
compares the GFI and AGFI values for the leadership performance construct CFA, the
safety culture perceptions construct CFA, and the SEM along with the associated degrees
of freedom for each model and shows that it is possible that both indices were biased
downward in the GOF statistic calculations for the SEM. Garson (2015) said that given
their susceptibility to sample size and degrees of freedom limitations, many researchers
no longer report GFI and AGFI when assessing model GOF. In the current model with
771 respondents and 1,464 degrees of freedom, given that the values of CMIN/df,
RMSEA, CFI, and NFI are at or above the conventionally accepted thresholds for model
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fit and given the limitations on GFI and AGFI when degrees of freedom are large relative
to sample size, it is concluded that the GOF measures demonstrate adequate fit for the
SEM and the data analyzed.

Table 20
Comparison of Model GFI and AGFI Values and Degrees of Freedom
Model

Degrees of Freedom GFI Value

AGFI Value

Safety Culture Perceptions CFA 211

.933

.912

Leadership Performance CFA

432

.908

.888

SEM

1464

.878

.862

Hypothesis Testing
The simplified SEM model in Figure 6 shows the standardized regression weights
associated with each of the paths tested by the hypotheses in this study. Regression
weights with asterisks are significant at p < .05 or better. Hypothesis test results are
summarized in Table 21.
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Figure 6. Simplified SEM model with hypotheses and standardized regression weights.
Notation has been adapted to reflect variable flow. The notation is not consistent with
that used in AMOS SEM modeling diagrams. Actual hypothesized SEM model appears
at Appendix F.

Given the data analyzed and the model presented, IS-BAO progression, leadership
performance in the political frame, and leadership performance in the symbolic frame did
not positively and significantly affect safety culture perceptions in the IS-BAO-registered
organizations that were examined. In contrast, leadership performance in the structural
frame and leadership performance in the human resources frame did positively and
significantly affect safety culture perceptions in those organizations. The impact of these
results will be discussed in the next section.
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Table 21
Hypothesis Test Results
Hypothesis (Relationship between
two items positive and significant)

Standardized
Regression Weight p value

Hypothesis
Supported?

1 - IS-BAO Progression & SCP

-.026

.933

No

2 - Leadership Performance in the
Structural Frame & SCP

.507

.013

Yes

3 - Leadership Performance in the
Human Resources Frame & SCP

.505

.002

Yes

4 - Leadership Performance in the
Political Frame & SCP

.268

.405

No

.095

No

5 - Leadership Performance in the
-.483
Symbolic Frame & SCP
Note: SCP = safety culture perceptions
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This research was the first scientific study conducted into the effects of both ISBAO progression and leadership performance on safety culture perceptions in the field of
business aviation. It was also the first study to examine and compare the effects of SMS
implementation, through IS-BAO, with the effects of leadership on the safety culture of
private corporate operators operating under 14 C.F.R. Part 91, a group that constituted a
large majority of the IS-BAO-registered operators who participated. The overall results
were somewhat mixed. In some respects, the results of this study seemed to echo the
conclusions of much of the literature surveyed, in that the leadership of aviation
organizations had a significant impact on the safety culture of those organizations. But
the study results also seemed to contrast much of the literature in that SMS
implementation, through IS-BAO and over time, seemed to have no impact on safety
culture whatsoever.
In the paragraphs to follow, the overall reliability and validity of the model will
be discussed, the results of each hypothesis test will be examined in detail, and possible
conclusions from those results will be discussed. Some overall conclusions will be
discussed as well. Finally, recommendations for further research will be presented.

Discussion and Conclusions
Reliability Analysis. The results of the reliability analysis (Table 13) were
largely unsurprising although the two-item scale for IS-BAO Progression proved more
reliable than anticipated given the standardized α value of .852. The scale reliability
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values for the safety culture perceptions constructs were better than those generated by
the pre-tests, and the values for the leadership performance constructs were better than
the historical averages provided by Bolman (2010). The overall scale reliability for all
safety culture perceptions values, all leadership performance values, and all values
combined were well above the required minimum. The overall instrument and its
associated sub-constructs were considered reliable and generated similar results among
the respondents participating in the study.

Validity Analysis. The leadership performance and safety culture perceptions
CFAs both demonstrated convergent validity. With the addition of the second order CFA
which linked both constructs, discriminant validity was demonstrated as well. The
leadership performance CFA, safety culture perceptions CFA, and SEM demonstrated
adequate model fit, given the limitations on GFI and AGFI as discussed earlier. In short,
the hypothesized model demonstrated adequate construct validity and was suitable to test
the hypotheses that were the basis of this research.

Hypothesis Tests and Conclusions. The purpose of this study was to examine
and compare the effects of IS-BAO progression and leadership performance on the
perceptions of safety culture in IS-BAO-registered business aviation organizations. The
results from the hypothesis tests showed mixed results in the examination of those
effects.
H1. H1A hypothesized that the relationship between IS-BAO progression and
safety culture perceptions would be positive and significant; specifically, that as an

83
organization matures through the three stages of registration and spends more time under
IS-BAO, more time under a safety management system, the health of the organization’s
safety culture, as measured by the perceptions of those in it, will improve. Given
previous studies, particularly McNeely (2012), this improvement in safety culture
perceptions seemed to be a logical conclusion. According to the SEM model and the
data, this relationship was not significant; i.e. statistically, no relationship exists. This
result is somewhat surprising for while the literature was somewhat divided on whether
safety culture was a precondition for or a product of SMS implementation, none of the
literature indicated that SMS implementation, in and of itself, had no impact on the safety
culture at all. Yet previous studies did not attempt to measure the impact of IS-BAO /
SMS progression on safety culture simultaneously with the impact of leadership
performance on safety culture, so while the effect of IS-BAO / SMS progression on
safety culture is not significant in this study, it may be that the effect of IS-BAO / SMS
progression on safety culture is simply overshadowed by the effect of leadership
performance on safety culture when the two are measured alongside one another.
Another possible conclusion may be that the success of the SMS where safety culture is
concerned is more about the leadership that implements the SMS than that success is
about the SMS itself.
H2. H2A hypothesized that the relationship between safety culture perceptions and
leadership performance in the structural frame would be positive and significant, and this
hypothesis was supported in the context of the SEM and the data analyzed. According to
Bolman and Deal (2013), the structural frame of leadership is about the structure of the
organization and the environment in which the organization operates. The structural
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frame also encompasses roles, goals, policies, and the use of technology (Bolman &
Deal, 2013). The structural construct corresponds well to the safety policies and
objectives element in the FAA’s (2010) framework for SMS, one of the pillars of an
effective SMS as the FAA describes it. The results from this hypothesis would seem to
echo the literature reviewed in that for a safety culture to be healthy, leadership must
establish and maintain a sound structure in which the culture may exist and in which the
SMS may operate. The strength of the standardized regression weight for this particular
leadership frame, .507, is impressive. For each one-unit improvement in leadership in the
structural frame, safety culture perceptions increase over .5 units. This conclusion speaks
to the importance of leadership that clearly defines the policies and procedures that
surround not only the SMS but the entire organization.
H3. H3A hypothesized that the relationship between safety culture perceptions and
leadership performance in the human resources frame would be positive and significant,
and this hypothesis was supported in the context of the SEM and the data analyzed. The
essence of leadership performance in the human resources frame is the leader taking care
of his or her people like a family and empowering them to perform (Bolman & Deal,
2013). Zohar (2010) maintained that a leader’s concern for his or her people’s welfare
made the leader more effective and strengthened the safety climate of the organization.
Here again it would seem that study results align with the literature, and leadership
performance in the human resources frame – a leader caring about his people – directly
affects the safety culture of the organization. The regression weight of this frame on
safety culture was nearly as high as that of the structural frame on safety culture, a .5-unit
increase in safety culture perceptions for every one-unit change in leadership
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performance in the human resources frame with a higher level of statistical significance
than that of the structural frame. Lipman (2012) echoed a quote that is the essence of
leadership as it is taught in the military: “take care of your people and they’ll take care of
you” (para 1). Where the effect of taking care of one’s people in an aviation environment
is concerned, the results of this hypothesis test seem to confirm that strong leadership in
the human resources frame does indeed affect the manner in which employees perceive
the safety culture and in so doing affects the way in which they contribute to the health of
the organization, per Wiegmann et al.’s (2002) definition of safety culture.
H4. H4A hypothesized that the relationship between safety culture perceptions and
leadership performance in the political frame would be positive and significant.
Statistically, the relationship was not significant although the regression weight was
positive. Bolman & Deal (2013) maintained that leadership in the political frame is about
competition, power, and agendas. Schein (2010) argued that one of the ways leaders
embed culture in their organizations is through the allocation of both resources and
power. Kotter (1996) spoke to the importance of leaders managing the politics within
their organizations to facilitate cultural change. While discussions on the importance of
the political element of leadership are somewhat common in literature that deals with
leadership alone, those same discussions are more difficult to find in literature that
focuses on safety culture. Stolzer et al. (2008) alluded to the political element of
leadership when they described the importance of the political role of the SMS champion
within an organization as the role of that position is politically enabled by the CEO or
accountable executive. Perhaps the most direct discussion of the influence of political
leadership on safety culture came from Antonsen (2009) who discussed the role of power,
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specifically political power, in organizational safety culture. He went as far as to argue
that issues of culture and power are so intertwined that safety culture research should
incorporate perspectives of power and conflict (Antonsen, 2009). Here, Antonsen’s
(2009) findings echo those of Schein (2010), and it would therefore seem illogical to
argue that politics and power do not play an important role in the creation and
maintenance of safety culture.
The results of the current study, however, stand in contrast to Antonsen’s (2009)
conclusion and indicate that political aspect of leadership is not significant. Yet in the
context of the SEM model, the political frame of leadership was not assessed singly but
alongside the structural, human resources and symbolic frames, both of which
demonstrated significance. A more correct interpretation of the results is not that the
political aspect of leadership is not significant, but instead that alongside of the influence
of structural and human resources interactions, a leader’s influence in the political frame
does not have the same level of significance. Given the literature’s emphasis on the
structural elements of leadership and the human resources elements but few discussions
on the political elements, this conclusion echoes the findings of others.
H5. H5A hypothesized that the relationship between safety culture perceptions and
leadership performance in the symbolic frame would be positive and significant. Here,
the results were somewhat surprising. For while the relationship was not significant, the
regression weight was negative. Bolman and Deal (2013) argued that the symbolic frame
is where cultural elements of an organization reside, but their depiction of these elements,
per the label of the frame, are limited to rituals, symbols, images, and the inspiration that
these elements create in subordinates. The questions in their instrument dealing with the
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symbolic frame reflect their conclusions. While Schein (2010) also discusses the
importance of rituals, symbols, and images, he maintains that culture is really about the
way things are done in an organization. Torres (2011) maintains that the credibility of
the commander directly affects the command climate or safety culture of an organization,
so it would appear that the symbols, or perhaps more pointedly, the trappings of
leadership and culture can perhaps have a negative effect on safety culture perceptions.
And, as the literature previously reviewed emphasizes, from a safety culture perspective,
leaders must lead by example through the actions they take, not the words they speak or
even the symbols they may create.
Once again though, it may be that in the context of the SEM and the data
analyzed, that alongside the effects of both leadership in the structural frame and
leadership in the human resources frame, the effects of leadership in the symbolic frame,
like the effects of leadership in the political frame, are pushed into insignificance. It is
also possible that the questions that assessed leadership in the symbolic frame may need
to be reexamined and perhaps modified to better assess the symbolic elements of both
organizational and safety culture.

Overall Conclusions. The results of this study clearly indicate that a program,
even one as well designed and intentioned as IS-BAO, cannot create or maintain a safety
culture in an organization without the facilitation and direction of the organization’s
leadership, particularly as leadership is exercised in the structural and human resources
frames.
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Leaders must direct the creation of policies and guidance at the organizational
level to facilitate the implementation and sustainment of the safety culture that allows ISBAO’s SMS to be effective. Leaders must also take care of their people and allow the
organization to serve its people as the people serve the organization, or more pointedly,
allow the SMS to serve the people who work inside of it as the people work inside the
SMS. Leaders must be collaborative in the manner in which SMS processes are executed
and provide the people who work inside the safety culture the freedom to make inputs to
improve the culture. Kotter (1996) argues that while leaders can start the process for
cultural change in an organization, the change is not complete until those inside the
organization embrace and internalize the change. The importance and interaction of the
structural and human resources frames of leadership where safety culture is concerned
would seem to parallel Kotter’s construct. Leaders must not only provide the structure to
facilitate safety culture, but they must also provide an environment where their people
can freely act inside the culture through the SMS. In so doing, leaders allow for closure
of the loop between their intentions for the safety culture and actions of their
subordinates, the combination of which make the culture real for the organization and
embed that culture into the organization.
Where the political and symbolic frames of leadership are concerned, the results
are inconclusive. While both elements, particularly the political one, are important in the
manifestation of leadership and the impact of that leadership on safety culture, it would
seem that the effects of leadership in the structural and human resources frame
overshadow the effects of leadership in the political and symbolic frames.
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Recommendations
This study examined leadership as a construct apart from safety culture and
produced an instrument that demonstrated reliability and validity to assess the
relationships between safety culture perceptions, IS-BAO progression and leadership
performance. While there are several ways in which the spectrum of knowledge on
safety culture could benefit from further research related to this study, the results of this
study are immediately applicable to the official literature dealing with safety management
system implementation and safety culture. Future investigation could further examine
leadership’s impact on safety culture, the SEM instrument used in this study, and the
effects of IS-BAO/SMS and the various leadership frames on safety culture.

Immediate Applicability to Official Literature. Official regulatory
publications on safety management system description and implementation, such as
ICAO’s Safety Management Manual, the FAA’s AC120-92A and IBAC’s IS-BAO
description, briefly discuss the importance of senior management involvement in the
creation, health and maintenance of an SMS. Yet, none of these documents provides a
detailed description of how organizational leadership affects the safety culture from
either a theoretical or practical perspective. Moreover, the documents do not discuss the
impact of specific leadership behaviors on safety culture. For organizations that are new
to SMS and safety culture and those organizations with an SMS that are attempting to
improve their safety culture, discussions dealing with the importance of leadership and
leadership behaviors could provide helpful insight into leadership’s critical role in safety
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culture creation and maintenance and perhaps challenge leaders to act in a way that better
supports the safety culture in their organizations.

Future Studies of Safety Culture and Safety Management Systems. As the
literature review in this study has demonstrated, there is much agreement in scholarly
literature on the importance of leadership’s role in the creation and maintenance of a
healthy safety culture. There are also several studies of both safety culture and safety
management systems that discuss how the two interact. While leadership has been
studied in some safety culture measurement studies, the leadership elements measured
were only those that were manifested through the safety culture. The current study was
different in that the construct it used examined leadership as a separate element, in and of
itself, and then examined the effects of leadership performance on safety culture
perceptions. Future studies that focus on safety culture should also examine leadership as
a separate element to further investigate the effects of leadership and leadership styles on
safety culture and SMS implementation. These studies could explore the use of other
leadership assessment instruments that evaluate leadership’s impact on the organization
and then compare the impact on safety culture perceptions. If smaller populations and
organizations were studied, perhaps more detailed leadership instruments like those of
The Leadership Circle could be utilized which could provide more in depth analyses of
the impact of leadership behaviors on safety culture perceptions.
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Further Refinement of the Instrument and Model. Since the first order
construct models for leadership performance and safety culture perceptions did not
provide sufficient evidence of discriminant validity, a second order construct was devised
that directly linked overall leadership performance as a latent variable, to safety culture
perceptions. After it was confirmed that correlation between overall leadership
performance and safety culture perceptions was less than the standardized regression
weights on the two constructs, the second-order model was not further investigated.
Future research could focus upon a model that incorporated IS-BAO or SMS progression
constructs into the second order construct to determine if that model fit the dataset better
than the SEM tested in this study. The current data or a future dataset could be evaluated
through the second order model and the appropriate hypotheses re-tested.

Further Research on the Effects of Leadership Performance in the Political
and Symbolic Frames. The effects of leadership performance in the political and
symbolic leadership frames in this study did not yield results that were significant, but
those results may have been overshadowed by the effects of leadership performance in
the structural and human resources frames. The literature confirms the importance of the
political frame of leadership in general, and there is some discussion about the effects of
politics and power on safety culture. Perhaps a version of the SEM that isolates and
focuses on both the political and symbolic frames of leadership might provide a better
examination of the impact of those frames on safety culture perceptions.
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Further Research on IS-BAO-registered Operators. As useful and
contributive to the body of knowledge this study may have been, the results were
somewhat limited by the lack of participation among the population of the operators who
were IS-BAO-registered. Since the results of this study will be published on IBAC’s
website and shared with the entire IS-BAO community, perhaps the dissemination of the
results will lead to more acceptance of this type of research by IS-BAO operators and
lessen the resistance to future data-gathering efforts. More attempts should be made to
gather additional data from inside the population of IS-BAO-registered operators, using
the same instrument to increase the sample size and confirm the conclusions herein.
Also, Sonnie Bates, the Director of IS-BAO for IBAC, has mentioned administering the
instrument to all IS-BAO-registrants when those registrants are audited for IS-BAO
renewal (personal communication, November 18, 2015), perhaps providing a mechanism
to increase the sample size without the perceived intrusiveness of mass-survey
distribution. Another mechanism for exploration could be an IBAC-provided abbreviated
questionnaire, based on the current instrument that would be administered to flight crew
members and maintenance personnel by IS-BAO auditors after observation of operational
flights or maintenance activities.

Further Research on All Business Aviation Operators. The relationship
between safety culture perceptions and leadership does not apply only to IS-BAO
registered operators. With support from the NBAA, a sampling frame comprised of ISBAO and non-IS-BAO operators that are NBAA members could be constructed and a
modified version of the study instrument administered to operators selected. The
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conclusions obtained from such a study could compare and contrast both the leadership
performance and safety culture perceptions of IS-BAO and non-IS-BAO operators.

Final Remarks
Business aviation is not a field that has historically attracted much scientific or
scholarly research, as demonstrated by the lack of literature surveyed that dealt with the
industry. This lack of scientific study has resulted in a corresponding lack of data where
many important subject areas are concerned leaving these areas subject to discussion
based on opinions and speculation. While the results of this study may be unsurprising to
some, they add empirical data in a vital topic area to an industry that needs it. The results
of this study confirm that safety culture in business aviation, as in commercial airline
aviation or even non-aviation industries, is about leadership, not a program. While there
is much more research that can be performed, perhaps now, given these results, the
discussion about safety culture and leadership in the business aviation industry can
transition from the realm of opinion and speculation to the realm of data and in so doing,
perhaps contribute to raising the level of safety in the industry even higher.
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APPENDIX A
Safety Culture Perception and Leadership Performance Survey Instrument
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APPENDIX B
First Pre-test Safety Culture Measurement Instrument with Citations
All questions, with the exception of respondent data, will be answered using a Likert 1-7
scale: strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, neither agree nor disagree, slightly
agree, agree, strongly agree
Respondent Data
What Stage of IS-BAO Registration has your organization attained?
How many years has your organization been IS-BAO registered?
How many aircraft does your organization operate?
How many people are in your organization?
What level position do you hold in your organization?

Measurement Area 1 – The Informed Culture. People are knowledgeable about the
human, technical, organizational and environmental factors that determine the safety of
the system as a whole (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008).
1. My organization places high priority on training.
2. Our procedures require all pilots to attend aircraft training twice yearly.
3. My leadership is more concerned with the budget than training.
4. We are required to complete all IS-BAO ancillary training items every 24 months.
5. Leadership makes me aware of all organizational factors that can affect the way I do

my job.
Measurement Area 2 – The Flexible Culture. People can adapt organizational
processes when facing high temporary operations or certain kinds of danger, shifting
from the conventional hierarchical mode to a flatter mode (Stolzer et al., 2008).
6. My operations manual allows for deviation from established procedures.
7. Line personnel are seldom asked for input when my organization’s procedures are

developed or changed (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006).
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8. Line personnel are actively involved in identifying and resolving my organization’s

safety or operational concerns (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden,
2006).
9. Line personnel have little real authority to make decisions that affect the safety of

normal flight operations (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006).
10. If I deviate from my organization’s operational procedures, I can expect disciplinary

action.
Measurement Area 3 – The Reporting Culture. People are prepared to report their
errors and experiences (Stolzer et al., 2008).
11. The safety reporting system is convenient and easy to use (Question adapted from

Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006).
12. All personnel can report safety discrepancies without fear of negative repercussions

(Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006).
13. All personnel are willing to report information regarding marginal performance or

unsafe actions of other employees (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden,
2006).
14. Personnel don’t bother reporting near misses or close calls since these events don’t

cause any real damage (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006.)
15. Personnel are willing to file reports about unsafe situations, even if the situation was

caused by their own actions (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006.)
Measurement Area 4 – The Learning Culture. People have the willingness and the
competence to draw conclusions from safety information systems and the will to
implement major reforms (Stolzer et al., 2008).
16. If I raise a safety issue it will be communicated to everyone else in my organization

(Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006).
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17. If I report a safety problem, it will be corrected in a timely manner (Question adapted

from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006).
18. My organization’s personnel are satisfied with the way the organization deals with

safety reports (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006).
19. My organization only keeps track of major safety problems and overlooks routine

ones (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006).
20. My organization is willing to change its procedures immediately if a safety concern is

identified.
Measurement Area 5 – The Just Culture. People are encouraged, and even rewarded,
for providing essential safety-related information. There is a clear line that differentiates
between acceptable and unacceptable behavior (Stolzer et al., 2008).
21. My organization’s leadership shows favoritism to certain personnel (Question

adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006).
22. Standards of accountability are consistently applied to all personnel in my

organization (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006).
23. When personnel make a mistake or do something wrong, they are dealt with fairly by

management (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006).
24. When an accident or incident happens, management immediately blames the

personnel involved. (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006).
25. Disciplinary policies are based on an agreed distinction between acceptable and

unacceptable behavior. The key determinant of blameworthiness is not so much the
act itself—error or violation—as the nature of the behavior in which it was
embedded. (Question adapted from Reason, Transport Canada, 2011).
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Measurement Area 6 – Leadership. The dynamic processes of culture creation and
management are the essence of leadership… leadership and culture are two sides of the
same coin (Schein, 2010).
26. Leadership acknowledges the nature of the organization’s activities as high-risk and

high-consequence (Question adapted from Stolzer et al., 2008).
27. Safety is a core value in my organization (Question adapted from Gibbons & von

Thaden, 2006).
28. Leadership creates a climate of trust throughout the organization and all personnel

believe they will be supported by the organization when they make decisions in the
interest of safety (Question adapted from Stolzer et al., 2008).
29. Leadership encourages the organization to actively seek hazards and safety risks and

when those hazards are identified, prompt action is taken to investigate and mitigate
them as practicable (Question adapted from Stolzer et al., 2008).
30. Leadership doesn’t show much concern for safety until there is an accident, incident

or anomaly which spotlights safety procedures (Question adapted from Gibbons &
von Thaden, 2006).
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APPENDIX C
Second Pre-test Revised Safety Culture Measurement Instrument
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APPENDIX D
Bolman and Deal’s Leadership Orientation Instrument (Others)
Name of person described:_____________________
Group code (if any):

_____________________

LEADERSHIP ORIENTATIONS (OTHER) 1
This questionnaire asks you to describe the person that you are rating in terms of
leadership and management style.
I. Leader Behaviors
You are asked to indicate how often each item is true of the person that you are
rating.
Please use the following scale in answering each item.

1
Never

2

3
Sometimes

Occasionally

4

5
Always

Often

So, you would answer '1' for an item that is never true of the person you are
describing, '2' for one that is occasionally true, '3' for one that is sometimes true, and
so on.
Be discriminating! The results will be more helpful to the ratee if you think about
each item and distinguish the things that the ratee really does all the time from the
things that s/he does seldom or never.

1

1. _____

Thinks very clearly and logically.

2. _____

Shows high levels of support and concern for others.

3. _____

Shows exceptional ability to mobilize people and resources to get things
done.

4. _____

Inspires others to do their best.
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5. _____

Strongly emphasizes careful planning and clear time lines.

6. _____

Builds trust through open and collaborative relationships.

7. _____

Is a very skillful and shrewd negotiator.

8. _____

Is highly charismatic.

9. _____

Approaches problems through logical analysis and careful thinking.

10. _____

Shows high sensitivity and concern for others' needs and feelings.

11. _____

Is unusually persuasive and influential.

12. _____

Is an inspiration to others.

13. _____

Develops and implements clear, logical policies and procedures.

14. _____

Fosters high levels of participation and involvement in decisions.

15. _____

Anticipates and deals adroitly with organizational conflict.

16. _____

Is highly imaginative and creative.

17. _____

Approaches problems with facts and logic.

18. _____

Is consistently helpful and responsive to others.

19. _____

Is very effective in getting support from people with influence and power.

20. _____

Communicates a strong and challenging vision and sense of mission.

21. _____

Sets specific, measurable goals and holds people accountable for results.

22. _____

Listens well and is unusually receptive to other people's ideas and input.

23. _____

Is politically very sensitive and skillful.

24. _____

Sees beyond current realities to create exciting new opportunities.

25. _____

Has extraordinary attention to detail.

26. _____

Gives personal recognition for work well done.

27. _____

Develops alliances to build a strong base of support.
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28. _____

Generates loyalty and enthusiasm.

29. _____

Strongly believes in clear structure and a chain of command.

30. _____

Is a highly participative manager.

31. _____

Succeeds in the face of conflict and opposition.

32. _____

Serves as an influential model of organizational aspirations and values.

I. Leadership Style
This section asks you to describe the leadership style of the person that you are rating.
For each item, give the number "4" to the phrase that best describes this person, "3" to the
item that is next best, and on down to "1" for the item that is least like this person.
1. The individual's strongest skills are:
_____ a. Analytic skills
_____ b. Interpersonal skills
_____ c. Political skills
_____ d. Ability to excite and motivate
2. The best way to describe this person is:
_____ a. Technical expert
_____ b. Good listener
_____ c. Skilled negotiator
_____ d. Inspirational leader
3. What this individual does best is:
_____ a.
_____ b.
_____ c.
_____ d.

Make good decisions
Coach and develop people
Build strong alliances and a power base
Energize and inspire others

4. What people are most likely to notice about this person is:
_____ a.
_____ b.
_____ c.
_____ d.

Attention to detail
Concern for people
Ability to succeed, in the face of conflict and opposition
Charisma.
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5. This individual's most important leadership trait is:
_____ a.
_____ b.
_____ c.
_____ d.

Clear, logical thinking
Caring and support for others
Toughness and aggressiveness
Imagination and creativity

6. This person is best described as:
_____ a.
_____ b.
_____ c.
_____ d.

An analyst
A humanist
A politician
A visionary

III. Overall rating
Compared to other individuals that you have known with comparable levels of experience
and responsibility, how would you rate this person on:
1. Overall effectiveness as a manager.
1
2
Bottom 20%

3
Middle 20%

4

5
Top 20%

2. Overall effectiveness as a leader.
1
2
Bottom 20%

3
Middle 20%

4

5
Top 20%

IV. Background Information
The following information will not be provided to the ratee, but will contribute to our efforts
to understand how perceptions of leadership styles are influenced by the relationship
between rater and ratee.
1. Are you: ____Male

____Female

2. Which of the following best describes your work relationship with the ratee:
_____

The ratee is at a higher level in the organization than I am.

_____

The ratee and I are at about the same organizational level.

_____

I am at a higher level in the organization than the ratee.
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_____

I am a client or customer of the ratee's organization.

_____

Other. Please specify: _____________________
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Bolman Permission to Use Instrument
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IBAC Approval for Research
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Final Leadership Performance Construct CFA Model
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Final Safety Culture Perceptions Construct CFA Model
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Second Order Leadership Performance and Safety Culture Perceptions CFA
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Final SEM Model

